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SUMMARY
A multilayer security solution for digital communication systems is provided by
considering the joint effects of physical-layer security channel codes with application-
layer cryptography. We address two problems: first, the cryptanalysis of error-prone
ciphertext; second, the design of a practical physical-layer security coding scheme.
To our knowledge, the cryptographic attack model of the noisy-ciphertext attack
is a novel concept. The more traditional assumption that the attacker has the ci-
phertext is generally assumed when performing cryptanalysis. However, with the
ever-increasing amount of viable research in physical-layer security, it now becomes
essential to perform the analysis when ciphertext is unreliable. We do so for the
simple substitution cipher using an information-theoretic framework, and for stream
ciphers by characterizing the success or failure of fast-correlation attacks when the
ciphertext contains errors.
We then present a practical coding scheme that can be used in conjunction with
cryptography to ensure positive error rates in an eavesdropper’s observed ciphertext,
while guaranteeing error-free communications for legitimate receivers. Our codes are
called stopping set codes, and provide a blanket of security that covers nearly all
possible system configurations and channel parameters. The codes require a public
authenticated feedback channel.
The solutions to these two problems indicate the inherent strengthening of security
that can be obtained by confusing an attacker about the ciphertext, and then give
a practical method for providing the confusion. The aggregate result is a multilayer





Cryptography—literally, secret writing—has been used as a means of securing private
information for roughly 3500 years, dating back to 1500 B.C. in ancient Mesopotamia
where scribes encrypted secret recipes for pottery glazes using substitution ciphers
[2]. Wartime encryption followed shortly thereafter, with the ancient Spartans being
the first to employ military cryptography [2]. Their system was known as the scytale,
pictured in Figure 1. The apparatus in the figure was used to construct a permutation
on the letters in the message. First, a scroll or leather strip was wrapped around a
stick of known proportions. Then, the message was written across the wrappings.
The intended recipient of the message possessed a stick of the same proportions, and
thus, could wrap the leather strip around his own stick and easily read the message.
Perhaps one of the most famous military commanders to employ cryptography was
Julius Caesar, who used a shift cipher to encrypt his personal and military messages
[2].
Figure 1: Depiction of a scytale, an instrument that provided ancient Spartans with
a simple mechanism for performing permutation encryption and decryption. Figure
obtained from [1].
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The cryptanalysis of these early ciphers always assumes that an attacker has access
to the complete encrypted message. After all, full knowledge of the cryptogram or
ciphertext must have been available to an attacker because the very nature of ancient
cryptanalysis required physically intercepting the sent message. Today, however, en-
crypted data are communicated over error-prone communication channels; therefore,
this assumption no longer holds in general. In 1975, Aaron Wyner introduced the
concept of the wiretap channel [3], and with it, the notion of physical-layer security.
A modern version of the wiretap channel model is presented in Figure 2. The model
depicts an entity named Alice who sends a secret message to a receiver named Bob
through the main channel of communications, which is denoted Qm. During data
transfer, an eavesdropper named Eve overhears the transmitted message, although
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Figure 2: Wiretap channel model depicting Alice sending a message to Bob over
the main channel Qm, while Eve listens in on their communications over the wiretap
channel Qw.
Although traditional cryptanalysis models assume that the ciphertext is known
to an attacker, the wiretap channel model can be used to consider cases where an
eavesdropper only has access to error-prone data. Physical-layer security is then
any security obtained by exploiting the physical characteristics, e.g., noise, of the
communications channels. Since Wyner’s paper in 1975, coding schemes have been
found that take advantage of irregularities in communication channels for secrecy,
although most of them are somewhat impractical for real world implementation. Our
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approach to security of transmitted data is considered a multilayer approach, as
outlined in Figure 3. First, we wish to understand how the strength of a cryptosystem
is affected when an attacker’s ciphertext is contaminated with errors. Second, we wish
to provide practical channel coding techniques that offer reliability for legitimate
receivers, and exploit the noisy physical layer of a communications system to add
confusion, or a positive error rate in the ciphertext, for eavesdroppers. Finally, we
consider the joint security of coding with cryptography and discuss the benefits of






















Figure 3: General overview of a multilayer approach to security including key-based
encryption and decryption and keyless physical-layer encoding and decoding in a
wiretap channel setting.
There is a danger in relying on only one layer of security, regardless of how strong
that layer is considered to be. Typical arguments against cryptography as a stan-
dalone security solution are firstly, that modern ciphers are designed around the
assumption that certain mathematical operations are hard to compute. For example,
the factoring of large integers, is deemed a hard problem if the integers are large
enough. However, no proof exists showing this problem to conclusively be difficult.
We simply do not have efficient ways to solve this problem right now [4]. Further-
more, modern ciphers can often be attacked through side avenues when users employ
the systems incorrectly, or using social engineering, thus relieving attackers from the
3
necessity of attacking the assumed hard problems by inadvertently opening other
ways for them to obtain the data. Finally, there is nothing to stop entities from
accidentally making use of outdated ciphers with known efficient attacks.
Of course, it would be foolish to reject cryptography because of these potential
weaknesses. Let us say, that instead of cryptography, we now wish to rely solely on
physical-layer coding techniques for data security. After all, the security measures are
information-theoretic, and information-theoretic security is now commonly accepted
as the strictest form of security [4]. However, there are many systems in the real
world that provably cannot benefit from physical-layer security. For example, in a
system without feedback, if an eavesdropper has a better channel than a legitimate
receiver, physical-layer security schemes will either offer no protection or possibly
limited protection depending on how much information the transmitting party knows
about the system. Clearly then, relying on physical-layer security exclusively, is not
a viable option for security in many instances.
We suggest that the proper implementation of physical-layer security in modern
systems provides an enhancement to already-encrypted data. Again, a multilayered
approach to security can provide the benefits of both physical-layer security and cryp-
tographic security in the same system. The two layers are extremely complimentary
to one anther, as will be seen throughout this work. Furthermore, physical-layer se-
curity schemes are often keyless, relying only on channel characteristics for secrecy.
Since secret key distribution can be somewhat painful in a practical system, it makes
sense to look into physical-layer security techniques as a possible simplification in the
key requirements of a system.
As a roadmap through the remaining chapters of this dissertation, we provide the
following explanation. It will first be beneficial to provide a system-level overview
as well as set forth some general notation, and then present some basic background
in information theory, cryptography, channel coding, and physical-layer security. All
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of this is done in Chapter 2. In addressing the issue of cryptanalysis of imperfect
ciphertext, we look at characterizing the security enhancement that can be obtained
if channel coding can simply provide a positive error rate in the eavesdropper’s re-
ceived data stream. In Chapter 3 we analyze the simple substitution cipher in an
information-theoretic sense when symbols of ciphertext are erased at random through
a communications channel. The security enhancement from the erasures is given in
terms of equivocation, or conditional entropy. Since substitution ciphers are often
included in more modern and complex ciphers, this analysis may provide insights
into a number of current cryptosystems. Then, thinking more practically, we inves-
tigate stream ciphers in Chapter 4, providing insight into how cryptosystems can be
individually analyzed based on existing attacks to chart the effects of errors in the
ciphertext.
Following our discussions on cryptanalysis of noisy ciphertext, we move on to a
novel practical physical-layer channel coding scheme in Chapter 5 that exploits packet
erasures in the wiretap channel for secrecy. The coding at the physical layer is based
on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, and assumes authenticated public feed-
back channels for all legitimate receivers of the transmitted data. Several encoding
and packaging techniques are leveraged for secrecy within the design to provide a
blanket of security that covers almost all possible channel parameter configurations.
We move on to further discuss the implications of combined security from cryptog-
raphy and the physical-layer in Chapter 6. Initial findings of the interplay between
channel coding for secrecy and cryptography are encouraging in that for codes and
ciphers analyzed, we have been able to characterize physical-layer security by not-
ing the reduced effectiveness of known attacks, or the increase in general confusion,
given a certain percentage of errors at the eavesdropper’s receiver. We also note that
our proposed encoder and decoder provide an error rate in excess of the decoding
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threshold to an eavesdropper while maintaining reliable communication with legiti-
mate parties using feedback. We also provide some conclusions and discuss future
work that may stem from this research in Chapter 6.
As a guide through the publications of the author, Chapter 3 is drawn almost
exclusively from [5]. Chapter 4 is primarily comprised of material from [6, 7] and
[8]. The physical-layer coding scheme in Chapter 5 can be found in the literature in
[9, 10] and [11]. Each of these papers, to some degree, express the idea of combined




As a precursor to addressing the problem of combined security derived from both
cryptography and physical-layer security, it is first requisite to provide a system-level
overview of the general setup, and set forth some notation regarding that system.
In addressing the big picture up front, it is easier to see how each result contributes
to the overall goal of this work, that is, to provide combined security through cryp-
tography and physical-layer security coding. It is also necessary to give some basic
background in information theory, cryptography, channel coding, and physical-layer
security. When discussing physical-layer security in this chapter, we also discuss
some of the short-comings of specific code designs that offer security, and introduce a
new metric, degrees of freedom, that may be useful in assessing the security of some
physical-layer schemes.
2.1 System-Level Overview and Notation
In a typical digital communications system, we anticipate a setup similar to that
shown in Figure 4. We see a source of data, say Alice, and a destination for that data
to be transmitted or sink, say Bob. Assume that Alice’s data are discrete symbols
from a generic alphabet A. Prior to transmission of Alice’s data, she may choose to
pass the data through a series of encoders. Figure 4 depicts three encoders; namely, a
source encoder, a cryptographic encoder, and a channel encoder [12]. Of course, Bob’s
receiver possesses matching decoders in reverse order. The source encoder removes
redundancy in the data through some compression algorithm [13]; the cryptographic
encoder conceals the meaning of the data from potential attackers of the system [14];
and finally, the channel encoder adds redundancy back into the data for the purpose
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of error detection and correction [12]. The research presented in this work deals
primarily with the cryptographic encoder and the channel encoder. Thus, we often





















Figure 4: Typical digital communications system with a series of encoders and de-
coders.
Throughout this work, we will follow the signal conventions and basic general
design portrayed in Figure 5. The figure shows a compressed message M as the input
to a cryptographic encoder with cryptogram E as the output. The signal is then
encoded and packetized to obtain a collection of packets X for transmission. Bob
receives a collection of packets Y through the main channel Qm, while Eve receives
packets Z through the wiretap channel Qw. Both channels are assumed to be packet
erasure channels (PECs), meaning the receiver either receives full information about a
packet or zero information about a packet with some fixed probability. The design of
the encoder in Chapter 5 exploits the nature of packet erasure channels (and may also
be applicable to other types of channels), and magnifies errors in the decoder caused
by missing packets, all the while providing reliable communications to Bob using an
authenticated feedback channel for automatic repeat request (ARQ). To be clear, all
traffic on the feedback channel is public knowledge, so Eve can listen to everything
occurring on the channel. However, since the channel is authenticated, Alice can
detect whether or not transmissions on the channel come from a trusted source. This
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effectively reduces Eve to passive status. Erasures occur with probability δ in the main
channel and with probability ε in the wiretap channel. Both Bob and Eve attempt
to decode the data to obtain the cryptogram E. Bob’s decoder output is denoted Ẽ,
and Eve’s is Ê. Finally, Bob decrypts using the known secret key K and obtains M̃ .
Eve does not know the secret key, and thus, must attack the cryptogram to obtain
M̂ , her best estimate of the message. The system design guarantees that the decoded
and decrypted message M̃ for Bob is error free so that Pr(M̃ 6= M) = 0, while
guaranteeing decoding failure for Eve with high probability for almost all channel
state parameter pairs (δ, ε). Clearly Eve can conceivably obtain partial information
about the message in such a context. The encoder design, however, seeks to mitigate
the usefulness of any leaked information in an attack.
Given this setup, it will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6 how missing packets at
the eavesdropper propagate incorrect bit assignments through the system so that
the decoded ciphertext is extremely unreliable. As a result, normally successful at-
tacks against the cryptographic layer fail reliably because of excessive error rates in
the ciphertext. This problem of cryptanalysis with error-prone ciphertext is actually
treated first in Chapters 3 and 4. Eve can be made to receive error-prone cipher-
text, even when she has a better channel than Bob, because Bob can request missing
packets. Since the feedback channel is authenticated, Eve cannot make requests of
her own. The intersection between the set of dropped packets in Qm and the set of
dropped packets in Qw may yet be obtained by the eavesdropper during retransmis-
sions; however the packets dropped in Qw that are not dropped in Qm are forever lost
to Eve.
It is also worth noting that since chapters in this dissertation address either noisy
ciphertext cryptanalysis or the design of physical-layer security codes, we will find
it advantageous to ignore portions of Figure 5 for chapters at a time. However, it





















Figure 5: General overview of a multilayer approach to security including cryptog-
raphy and physical-layer security, in a packet-loss environment with authenticated
feedback for Bob.
different layers of security.
Regarding other basic notation, the manuscript will adhere to the following rules
throughout the document.
x A scalar (lowercase).
xn A length-n row vector (bold lowercase, superscript may be omitted).
X A random variable, set, event, etc. taken in context (uppercase).
Xn A length-n random vector (bold uppercase, superscript may be omitted).
Xm×n An m× n matrix (bold uppercase, superscripts may be omitted).
X An alphabet of discrete symbols (caligraphy).
Pr (X) The probability of event X.
E[X] The expectation of random variable X.
pX(x) The probability mass function (pmf) of discrete random variable X.
H(X) Shannon entropy of discrete random variable X (in bits). See Definition 1.




Physical-layer security is a research area in information theory, and hence, most of the
traditional security metrics are information-theoretic. Hence, we provide here a brief
overview of basic information-theoretic quantities, and refer the interested reader to
[13] for more details. For the following definitions, assume X and Y to be discrete
random variables with respective pmfs pX(x) defined over X and pY (y) defined over
Y .





The entropy can be thought of as a measure of the uncertainty in guessing real-
izations of a random variable. Therefore, if a value in X occurs with probability zero,
then the entropy that value contributes to the total entropy of X is also zero. This
makes sense, because an event or value that never occurs cannot possibly increase our
uncertainty of the random variable. Specifically, all information-theoretic definitions
assume 0 · log 0 = 0. Also note that all of the logarithms in this work are base two,
and thus, all information-theoretic quantities are measured in bits.




pY (y)H(X|Y = y).
Intuitively, H(X|Y ) is a measure of the uncertainty in X that is not shared by Y ,
or the uncertainty that remains in X if Y is known.
Definition 3. The mutual information between X and Y is calculated as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ).
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This quantity is equal to the amount of information that X and Y share, or the
amount of information that one can theoretically collect about one if you know the
other. Mutual information is symmetric in that I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X).
Definition 4. A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) is a channel with input mod-
eled by the discrete random variable X and output modeled by the discrete random
variable Y where the probabilities of specific outputs in Y are determined by tran-
sition probabilities pY |X(y|x). The memoryless aspect of the channel indicates that
the ith channel output is only a function of the ith channel input.
Definition 5. For a communications channel, if X is the input and Y is the output,




Note that X and Y are still deemed to be discrete random variables, therefore, the
channel with capacity C can be described by transition probabilities pY |X(y|x). The
intuitive notion of channel capacity is the highest encoding rate that the channel can
support with vanishingly low probability of error. This is discussed further in Section
2.4. The maximization is over all possible distributions on X. Therefore, there may
be some inputs that cannot achieve the channel capacity due to their distributions.
2.3 Cryptography and Perfect Secrecy
Many cryptosystems in place today measure security computationally. If all attacks
are computationally intractable, then the system is deemed to be secure. The chief
failings of this notion of security are the assumptions placed on the attacker. First,
it is assumed that the attacker has limited resources to confront the problem, even
if those resources are state of the art. Second, new and unanticipated algorithmic
attacks can be developed against the conjectured hard problems. Claude Shannon
addressed these shortcomings by defining the notion of perfect secrecy [15]. This
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was the first attempt at measuring security with an information-theoretic metric.
Information-theoretic security makes no computational assumptions on the attacker,
and is accepted as the strictest form of security [16].
Definition 6. If a secret message M is encrypted to form a cryptogram E using a
secret key K, then perfect secrecy is achieved if
H(M |E) = H(M), (2)
that is, if the ciphertext provides no information about the message. Note that the
entropies in (2) are calculated assuming K is chosen according to some random key
distribution (usually uniform).
We note here, that the quantity H(M |E) is typically called the message equivo-
cation, and H(K|E) is called the key equivocation.
2.3.1 One-Time Pad
Shannon analyzed the one-time pad cipher shown in Figure 6, and found that it
achieves perfect secrecy. This cipher uses a key K composed of uniformly random
binary data, and encrypts M by the operation
E = M ⊕K, (3)
where ⊕ signifies a bitwise exclusive-or (X-OR) function. The decoding assumes a
noiseless channel and combines the same key with the received data Ê to recover the
message
M̂ = Ê ⊕K. (4)
This type of cryptography is symmetric, as the same key and operation perform both
encryption and decryption. Although the one-time pad attains perfect secrecy, it fails
to solve the practical problem of distributing the message, because |K| = |M |, and
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K must still be distributed secretly. In fact, Shannon proved that perfect secrecy is
only attainable if the key is at least as long as M , or more generally, only if
H(K) ≥ H(M). (5)
Although Shannon’s result seems disheartening, perfect secrecy also makes the lim-
iting assumption that an attacker has access to an error-free cryptogram; however,






M E Ê M̂
Figure 6: One-time pad.
2.4 Channel Coding
Channel codes are typically designed to make communications more reliable by adding
redundancy into transmitted data that allow for error detection and correction at the
receiver. Channel coding is also typically the last encoding rule prior to transmission
as shown in Figure 4, thus preventing the propagation of errors at the decoder, because
errors are corrected in the first step at the receiver. Since redundancy is added to the
data during channel encoding, the length of the data stream increases according to
the rate of the code.
Definition 7. Let k be the number of input bits to the encoder, and n be the number





and the code is called an (n, k) code.
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Thanks to the father of information theory, Claude Shannon, we know that for
rates less than the channel capacity C there exist channel codes that can obtain
arbitrarily low probability of decoding error [17].
2.5 Physical-Layer Security
For physical-layer security code design, we not only wish to obtain arbitrarily low
probability of decoding error for Bob, as in traditional channel coding, but also wish
to provide some level of security against Eve.
2.5.1 Theory of Physical-Layer Security
The theoretical basis for physical-layer security is derived from the wiretap channel
model, and then includes a number of different information-theoretical metrics for
security. The secrecy capacity of a system is then defined based on satsfying those
two goals. Our research also addresses regions of information leakage that do not
necessarily fit within established security metrics. Therefore, we also introduce a new
metric that allows us to account for information-theoretic security and cryptographic
security in tandem.
2.5.1.1 Wiretap Channel Model
In 1975, Aaron Wyner gave birth to physical-layer security with his degraded wiretap
channel model shown in Figure 7, along with a new condition for secrecy [3]. Let
a message M of length k be encoded into a codeword X of length n, and then
transmitted. A legitimate receiver obtains Y over the main channel denoted Qm, and
an eavesdropper obtains Z, a degraded version of Y , through an additional channel
called the wiretap channel Qw.
















M X Y M̃
Z
Figure 7: Degraded wiretap channel model depicting Alice sending a message to
Bob over the main channel Qm, while Eve observes Bob’s received data through yet
another channel Qw.
and is termed today weak secrecy.
Weak secrecy requires the rate of information leaked to an eavesdropper to go to
zero as the blocklength of the encoder gets large. Wyner showed that for rates up to
the secrecy capacity Cs, encoders and decoders exist that satisfy (7) and also achieve
arbitrarily low probability of error for intended parties in this degraded case, i.e.
when X → Y → Z is a Markov chain. Csiszár and Körner [18] later generalized these
results removing the degraded restriction, but still showed that Cs > 0, only if Qm
is less noisy than Qw. This more general version of the wiretap channel model was
already shown in Figure 2 in Chapter 1. For the general degraded wiretap channel,












= Cm − Cw, (11)
where Cm is the channel capacity of the main channel, and Cw is the channel capacity
of the wiretap channel. Note, for some channels, Cs = Cm − Cw, but in the general
degraded wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is at least equal to this difference.
Intuitively then, the greater the advantage in channel quality that a legitimate receiver
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can leverage over an eavesdropper, the higher the rate at which data can be encoded
but remain secret using only physical-layer security.
It is of some relevance to point out that there is a more meaningful secrecy con-
dition besides that of weak secrecy.
Definition 9. If a system is such that
lim
n→∞
I(M ;Z) = 0, (12)
then the system achieve strong secrecy.
Clearly this condition is much more restrictive on the information leakage than
is the weak secrecy condition in (7). Also, one may expect Cs to decrease if we
define secrecy capacity as the maximum encoding rate at which strong secrecy is
achievable, rather than weak secrecy. However, it is a well-known fact that for the
degraded wiretap channel model, the secrecy capacity is the same regardless of which
condition is used [19]. For more details as to the theory of physical-layer security, we
direct the interested reader to the first concise text on the matter [4]. It should also
be noted that semantic security addresses practical issues beyond those regarded in
these information-theoretic security definitions [20].
2.5.2 Practice of Physical-Layer Security
Significant advances in the understanding of theoretically achievable secrecy rates of
communication systems have been made beyond those already outlined—again, see
[4] for further details. However, another of the main challenges regarding physical-
layer security has been the design of practical schemes that achieve the secrecy rates
indicated by the theory. These schemes exploit noise in the channel at the physical
layer of the communications system to derive and magnify an advantage over the
eavesdropper.
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2.5.2.1 Notable Schemes and Techniques
The historical development of practical secrecy coding schemes began with Wyner
in his original wiretap paper. His design was also clarified in an extension of the
original work [21]. Here the general idea of partitioning a group code into cosets to
achieve secrecy was first presented. Wei noted in 1991 [22] that generalized Hamming
weights (which are defined based on the minimum-sized support for subcodes of linear
codes) can be used to characterize the performance of a linear code for the channel
model depicted in [21]. The coset coding technique was shown to apply to low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes (see [23] and [24]) much more recently in [25], where code
designs are given that achieve the weak secrecy condition in (7) for noiseless main
channels when the wiretap channel is a binary erasure channel (BEC). This work in
LDPC codes for secrecy has been furthered in [26, 27], where large-girth LDPC codes
are considered, and shown to meet the strong secrecy constraint in (12) in certain
cases. These codes always satisfy the weak secrecy condition when Qm is noiseless,
and Qw is a BEC. Some interesting recent work discusses polynomial-time algorithms
that provide semantic security to some systems [28].
Interleaving coded symbols has been used in [29] and [30] in conjunction with wire-
tap codes developed in [25] to offer secrecy to various systems. The secrecy properties
of nonsystematic LDPC codes have also been discussed in [31]. The works of [32, 33]
and [34] show how LDPC codes can be punctured to increase secrecy for scenarios
where legitimate parties have an advantage in channel quality over eavesdroppers.
Finally, it should be noted that Arıkan’s polar codes [35] can offer secrecy for general
symmetric channels, although code construction is an issue for non-erasure channels.
Schemes have been presented in [36] and [37] that achieve weak secrecy, although
these schemes only offer secrecy for degraded wiretap channels. Furthermore, design
of these codes is heavily contingent on perfect channel state information (CSI) at the
encoder. There remains a need to deliver schemes that are robust enough to offer
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security, even when system parameters are unknown to the designer.
2.5.2.2 Limitations of Current Schemes
While practical codes exist that obtain varying levels of information-theoretic security,
most designs suffer from one or more of several drawbacks. For instance, code designs
are almost always a function of specific channel parameters, or CSI, seen by legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers. Therefore, channels with varying or unknown parameters
present design issues. For example, in the case of an undetected eavesdropper, a
designer would have no information as to the channel parameters in Qw. Furthermore,
say an eavesdropper listens to wireless communications from a different location over
time. Then even if the eavesdropper could be detected, we would need time varying
codes to take advantage of this information.
Other codes offer secrecy for only specific types of channels, or only when the
eavesdropper’s channel is degraded. Still other designs are impractical in the real
world as a result of design complexity, necessary side information for legitimate de-
coding, or other limitations. Finally, the most glaring shortcoming of any scheme
that derives security from the physical layer of a communications system, is that
if an eavesdropper has a better channel than a legitimate receiver, say the channel
capacity of the wiretap channel Cw exceeds that of the main channel Cm, then the
scheme will likely fail. For some channels, Cw > Cm implies that the secrecy capacity
of the system is zero. For example, consider what occurs when an eavesdropper has
a noise-free channel and Z = X. These types of scenarios necessitate the coupling of
physical-layer security schemes with additional protection. Of course, cryptography
can fill that role nicely.
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2.5.2.3 Degrees of Freedom
For this reason, and as part of a preview of coming attractions, we want to consider
cases where the goal of the encoder is not necessarily to provide weak, strong, or per-
fect secrecy, but rather a constant positive error rate in an eavesdropper’s received
data. Assuming this data stream to be error-prone ciphertext provides a reasonable
model for comprehending the effects of physical-layer security coupled with cryptog-
raphy. It should be noted that this notion of security is in fact weaker than strong
secrecy and weak secrecy, but may provide a more practical context from which to
view the multilayer security problem.
Suppose that it is possible to encode already-encrypted data such that a legiti-
mate party receives the cryptogram with no errors, but an eavesdropper receives the
cryptogram with no information about some symbols. If there is truly no information
about these symbols available to an eavesdropper, they will be forced to attempt a
brute-force attack on this subset of symbols, that is, attacking the system by simply
guessing unknown values. Let us call these symbols for which an eavesdropper recov-
ers no information degrees of freedom D, because they represent degrees of freedom
in the cryptogram space for the eavesdropper [10].
As a comparison between D and more conventional security notions, if bits in E
are uniformly zero or one and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), then
perfect secrecy implies D = k, where k is the dimension of the encoder. This means
that there are exactly 2k equally likely binary length-k sequences with which to fill in
the missing data. Note that an encoder only has 2k possible codewords in the code.
Thus, every codeword is equally likely a posteriori to the eavesdropper in a perfectly
secure setup. In fact, on average there are E[2D] equally likely binary codewords
in a maximum a posteriori (MAP) decoder. This implies a multiplication of efforts
necessary to attack a cryptogram with D degrees of freedom.
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If the degrees of freedom are the only source of confusion to Eve, then the equiv-
ocation (measured in symbols) of the transmitted message X and the eavesdropper’s
received data Z is related to D in that H(X|Z) = E[D]. Therefore, we see that de-
grees of freedom can provide the answers to meaningful practical security questions,
as in how much stronger a system is if physical-layer security is employed to enhance
cryptography, but can also map back to information theoretic origins.
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CHAPTER III
SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER WITH ERASURES
Cryptanalysis is the process of computing the secret key or message of a cryptosystem
given the ciphertext [14]. Our problem requires estimating cryptographic strength
when the ciphertext has errors. Since security analysis of cryptographic systems is
aimed at proving the robustness of the system, a worst-case assumption that the
attacker has perfect ciphertext is traditionally made. Therefore, the analysis of the
strength of cryptography assuming errors in the ciphertext is a virtually untouched
research topic. Only now, under the framework of physical-layer security, does it be-
come a viable topic for investigation. In this chapter, we investigate the simple sub-
stitution cipher when ciphertext symbols are erased randomly at the eavesdropper’s
receiver. This chapter is derived from [5] and has been submitted for publication.
3.1 Motivation
In Shannon’s landmark paper on the communication theory of secrecy systems [15],
he discussed the secrecy of a simple substitution cipher. The encryption outputs
a cryptogram (ciphertext) E as a function of a message (plaintext) M and a key
K. His analysis provided the key equivocation H(K|E) for the simple substitution
cipher in general terms, and showed that H(K|E) and the message equivocation
H(M |E) are appropriate metrics for the characterization of the strength of ciphers.
Later, Blom [38] and Dunham [39] completed the specific calculations of H(K|E) and
H(M |E), respectively, for the simple substitution cipher, while additional security
characterizations were made by Sgarro in [40]. A common assumption made in all of
these initial works is that an attacker always has access to a clean version of E.
However, due to the contributions of Wyner [3] and others [18] as outlined in
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Chapter 2, we know that security against eavesdroppers can be formulated another
way that takes into account characteristics of a noisy communications channel through
which an eavesdropper obtains transmitted data. Many coding schemes were men-
tioned in Section 2.5.2.1 that are commonly called wiretap codes. These and others
like them, were developed to offer security by exploiting physical-layer characteristics.
In Chapter 5, we showcase our own code designs that were developed to further secure
already-encrypted data by structuring the leaked information such that attacks are
restricted to a brute-force search over a subset of symbols for which the attacker has
no information. In other words, the code gives degrees of freedom in Eve’s cryptogram
as discussed in Section 2.5.2.3.
In a real system, sufficient signal reliability at the eavesdropper may, however,
undermine physical-layer attempts at secrecy coding. Thus, we continue to stress
that wiretap codes should be coupled with cryptographic schemes for a more com-
plete security solution. This coupling removes the commonly assumed requirement
that codes must individually provide secrecy, but rather allows coding to act as a
security enhancement to cryptography. Suppose codes simply confuse attackers by
providing a positive error rate in an attacker’s eavesdropped cryptogram. The secu-
rity implications of such a code can then be characterized through cryptanalysis of
noisy ciphertext.
Chapter 4 will show this analysis for correlation attacks on stream ciphers. This
chapter will provide the analysis for the simple substitution cipher. The cryptanalysis
performed herein is information-theoretic, and addresses the setup of an eavesdropper
obtaining ciphertext through an erasure channel. The results are compared to the
analysis when the attacker always has an error-free version of the cryptogram [38, 39].
The comparison quantifies the increase in security obtainable by wiretap coding. Since
substitution ciphers are often a significant piece in more modern cryptosystems, this
analysis may also carry over to more current ciphers. Furthermore, this analysis can
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be seen as a first look at the noisy-ciphertext attack for block ciphers.
Regarding the rest of the chapter, notation specific to Chapter 3 is set forth in
Section 3.2, while Section 3.3 provides the background to the substitution cipher and
the packet erasure channel model. Section 3.4 then calculates the key equivocation
and the message equivocation for the cipher assuming erased symbols, and the results
are discussed by way of conclusion in Section 3.5.
3.2 Notation
Recall X = {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes a finite set, or alphabet of discrete symbols. A
length-L vector of symbols from X is denoted xL = (x1, x2, . . . , xL) ∈ X L. Through-
out the chapter, however, it is often more useful to consider symbols as they occur
randomly, and hence we write
XL = (X1, X2, . . . , XL), (13)
to signify a random vector of message symbols drawn from X according to a proba-
bility mass function (p.m.f.) pX(x). The superscript on vectors may be omitted when
L is obvious.
Furthermore, consider that vectors xL and yL are composed of symbols from some
alphabet, and then elements from one or more of the vectors are randomly erased,
i.e., no information is known about them. Let ŷL and x̂L be the resulting output




signify that x̂i = ŷi for every i where both x̂i 6= e and ŷi 6= e. Thus, if (14) holds, the
equality of xL and yL can only be determined if both x̂L and ŷL have zero erasures.
At times, we will find it easier to work with patterns of symbols, rather than
the symbols themselves. Borrowing notation from [41], we define the index ıxL(x) to
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be one more than the number of distinct symbols occurring in xL prior to the first
appearance of x. The pattern of xL is then given as the concatentation
Ψ(xL) = ıxL(x1)ıxL(x2) . . . ıxL(xL). (15)
For example, if x = (2, 3, 5, 2, 4, 2, 5, 2, 2, 1), then Ψ(x) = 1231413115 because ıx(2) =
1, ıx(3) = 2, ıx(5) = 3, ıx(4) = 4, and ıx(1) = 5.
Since this chapter deals only with the substitution cipher, all length-L vectors
that have the same pattern are said to belong to the same residue class. This term
is properly defined in Section 3.3.1 with more background on the substitution cipher.
For now, suppose these residue classes are indexed, and again take the vectors with




to indicate that the erasures in x̂L and ŷL prevent us from knowing whether or not
Ψ(xL) = Ψ(yL).
Finally, let us also denote S(xL) as the number of unique symbols in xL. For
example, if x = (2, 1, 2, 6, 6, 5), then S(x) = 4. Thus, S(XL) is a random variable
with distribution dependent on pX(x) and L.
3.3 Background
This section presents the simple substitution cryptosystem, and the erasure wiretap
channel in turn.
3.3.1 Simple Substitution Cipher
LetM = {1, 2, . . . , N} be a finite set representing the source alphabet. The message
source M is memoryless, i.e., symbols are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), and source realizations are drawn from M according to the p.m.f. pM . We
will adopt the shorter notation pM(i) = qi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and note that pM is not
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necessarily uniform over M1. This signifies the lack of source coding in the system.
The cryptogram alphabet E is equal to M. The simple substitution encryption rule
maps the message M to the cryptogram E, and is a function of the key K which
is taken from the keyspace K. Let T = {Tj(·)}Jj=1 be the collection of all invertible
transformations from M onto E . The encryption scheme chooses a key randomly,
which then acts as an index for a transformation from T . The distribution on keys
is uniform, and K contains every mapping of N symbols onto N symbols. Thus,
J = |K| = N !, and each occurs with probability 1
N !
.
We can then write TK(M
L) = EL as the encryption mechanism, or more precisely,
TK(M1,M2, . . . ,ML) = (TK(M1), TK(M2), . . . , TK(ML))
= (E1, E2, . . . , EL). (17)
The decryption rule is similarly denoted as T−1K (E
L) = ML. Of course, the cryptosys-
tem is such that
T−1k (Tk(m
L)) = mL,∀k ∈ K and ∀mL ∈ML. (18)
It was noted by Shannon in [15, pg. 674] that the simple substitution cipher is a
pure cipher, meaning that for every i, j, k ∈ K there exists some s ∈ K such that
TiT
−1
j Tk = Ts (19)
and every key is equally likely. Shannon then went on to define residue classes for pure
ciphers. In essence, the set of residue classes are mutually exclusive in the message
space ML, and the messages from a particular residue class can all be enciphered
into the same subset of cryptograms. This signifies that there are residue classes in
EL as well as inML. For the substitution cipher, the set of residue classes ofML are
1This nonuniformity provides the structure for frequency analysis attacks against the cryptosys-












Figure 8: Packet erasure wiretap channel model for simple substitution cipher.
the set of length-L patterns that can be formed using an alphabet of size N . Also,
encryption does not change the pattern of symbols in a substitution cipher, so mL
can only be encrypted into eL if Ψ(mL) = Ψ(eL).
3.3.2 Erasure Wiretap Channel
Figure 8 shows the channel model we assume throughout this chapter to be the packet
erasure wiretap channel. Alice wishes to transmit a message M secretly to Bob. She
thus employs a secret key K to encrypt M into a cryptogram E using the simple sub-
stitution cipher. Bob receives E error free over a noiseless communications channel,
and applies his knowledge of K to decrypt E back to M . An eavesdropper named
Eve listens in on the communication between Alice and Bob, albeit with independent
randomly occurring packet erasures, where packets are erased with probability ε and
obtained error free with probability (1−ε). For our analysis, each packet is comprised
of exactly one ciphertext symbol; thus, the channel model could also be presented
as a symbol erasure channel. The received vector of symbols at the eavesdropper is
given as ZL = (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZL), where each Zi is a random variable over the alphabet
Z = {M ∪ e}. Note that this model is akin to the overall system model given in
Figure 5 in Section 2.1, but only the pieces crucial to this chapter are shown in Figure
8.
3.4 Security with Noisy Ciphertext
The following was noted in [15] and later more formally in [39].
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Theorem 1 (Dunham [39], Theorem 1). For any cipher system
H(ML|EL) + H(K|ML,EL) = H(K|EL). (20)
Proof. The proof of the theorem is instructive. The starting point is given by equating
the two relations
H(K,ML|EL) = H(ML|EL) + H(K|ML,EL)
H(K,ML|EL) = H(K|EL) + H(ML|K,EL). (21)
Then the theorem is easily shown by realizing that H(ML|K,EL) = 0 by (18), that
is, knowing the key and the cryptogram leaves no uncertainty about the message.
Consider the case where encrypted symbols are erased independently at random
with probability ε to form ZL. Equating the following expressions no longer leads us
to an obvious simplification.
H(K,ML|ZL) = H(ML|ZL) + H(K|ML,ZL)
H(K,ML|ZL) = H(K|ZL) + H(ML|K,ZL). (22)
Now, only knowing the received error-prone vector ZL and K, we cannot recover
ML unless ZL has no erasures. We can, however, calculate H(ML|K,ZL) without
too much work. Making use of the chain rule and the independent and memoryless
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Now we combine (22) and (23), and state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If message symbols are i.i.d., then for any cipher system where Ei is only
a function of K and Mi, and ciphertext symbols in E
L are then erased independently
at random with probability ε to yield ZL,
H(K|ZL) = H(ML|ZL) + H(K|ML,ZL)− εLH(M). (24)
This change in the relationship of equivocations due to the erasure channel comes
as no surprise. Intuitively, we might anticipate such a term as εLH(M) to enter into
the relationship between key and message equivocation, as the i.i.d. nature of the
source symbols clearly gives no way of recovering M if Z = e, even if the key is
known.
3.4.1 Key Equivocation
To solve for the new key equivocation given erasure-prone ciphertext, H(K|ZL), we




















The one new piece of notation in this expression is the vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN)
which is a frequency vector for messages mL ∈ ML. The ith element of x signifies
the number of times i occurs in mL. For example, if mL = (3, 2, 4, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3), and




xn = L. (26)
The following relationship exists between the key equivocation under the erasure
channel case and that obtained through noise-free ciphertext.
Lemma 2 (Key Equivocation). When a message of i.i.d. source symbols ML is
encrypted using a simple substitution cipher, and ciphertext symbols EL are erased

































ε(L−i)(1− ε)i if zL e= Tk(mL),
0 otherwise,
(30)




























i)) = qx11 q
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2 . . . q
xN
N , (33)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN) now represents the frequency of symbols that occur only
in the non-erased symbols as they are mapped back to M. Finally, plugging the
combined result of (33) and (32) back into (28), along with some careful counting to




























Comparison of (34) and (25) shows the proof to be complete.
3.4.2 Message Equivocation
In solving for the result of the message equivocation H(ML|ZL), we first remark
that knowing H(K|ZL) allows us to solve for the key appearance equivocation2
H(K|MLZL), and then apply the result from Lemma 1 given in (24) to solve for
the message equivocation as
H(ML|ZL) = εLH(M) + H(K|ZL)−H(K|ML,ZL). (35)
Since H(K|ML,ZL) is a much simpler calculation than H(ML|ZL), we will take this
approach.
Again, we start by borrowing a result about the key appearance equivocation for
noiseless ciphertext.
Theorem 2 (Dunham [39], Theorem 2). If a discrete source is enciphered by a simple
substitution cipher with equiprobable key and the source alphabet has N letters, we
2The expression key appearance equivocation was originally given to the quantity H(K|ML,EL)
to signify the remaining key equivocation following an L-length message in a known plaintext attack






PSL(i) log((N − i)!). (36)
Recall that S(ML) signifies the number of unique symbols in ML. The notation
PSL(i) is simply the probability that S(M
L) equals i. We will consider varying length
vectors in the following derivations, and so more generally, PSj(i) = Pr(S(M
j) = i)
for any length-j vector of symbols.
Lemma 3 (Key Appearance Equivocation). If symbols in ML are i.i.d. and encrypted
using a simple substitution cipher with equally likely keys to form EL, and then ZL is























L, zL) log((N − S(zL))!) (38)
because there are exactly S(zL) unique symbols that are revealed in zL. Given we
know the plaintext as well in the key appearance equivocation, this leaves N −S(zL)
symbols that we have yet to identify in the key. Thus,
H(K|ML = mL,ZL = zL) = log((N − S(zL))!) (39)


























ε(L−i)(1− ε)i if zL e= Tk(mL),
0 otherwise.
(41)







L)ε(L−i)(1− ε)i if Ψ(mL) e= Ψ(zL)
0 otherwise.
(42)











× pML(mL)ε(L−i)(1− ε)i log((N − S(zL))!). (43)
Since we are summing over all possible messages in ML, and because both erasures



















log((N − S(ei))!). (44)
Furthermore, since there are exactly N !
(N−S(ei))! different symbol combinations for e
i













L) log((N − S(mi))!). (45)












PSi(j) log((N − j)!). (46)
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Finally, by comparison of (46) and (36), we arrive at (37), and the proof is complete.
We can now combine our results to write the expression for the message equivo-
cation.
Theorem 3 (Message Equivocation). For a simple substitution cipher that encrypts
an L-length memoryless plaintext message ML into ciphertext EL, if symbols are
erased independently with probability ε from EL to form ZL, then








Proof. From (24) in Lemma 1, we receive our starting point, and thus can derive the
relationship as follows.





















The second relation comes directly from (27) in Lemma 2 and (37) in Lemma 3, while
the final expression comes from (20) in Theorem 1.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In conclusion, we have solved for the key equivocation, key appearance equivoca-
tion, and message equivocation when cryptogram symbols are obtained independently
through a symbol erasure channel by an eavesdropper. We have chosen to discuss
the respective results of Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 3 together because of the
similar nature of the expressions in (27), (37), and (47). These expressions show that
the three equivocations are all affected similarly by the erasure channel. We see a
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weighted sum in each expression, where the total amount of equivocation is equal to
the combination of equivocations for clean cryptograms of all lengths between zero
and L. The weighting of each equivocation is simply the probability that the right
number of erasures will occur to leave an effective cryptogram of that length. Only
the message equivocation carries an additional term signifying the lost information
that cannot be recovered about the message due to erasures. This additional term
also presents a bias in the equivocation such that the message equivocation will only
converge to zero if no erasures occur in the channel. Therefore, the key equivoca-
tion should be used to measure the strength of the system rather than the message
equivocation.
These relations are clearly dependent on the memoryless message source in the
problem setup, and prompt us to consider message sources with additional structure
in the future so as to apply the results to encrypted messages in a true spoken lan-
guage. We see also, through simple comparisons of the results with their erasure-free
counterparts, that if a wiretap code can force erasures of ciphertext symbols upon an
eavesdropper, that the total equivocation at the eavesdropper will increase. Surely




CRYPTANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHER WITH BIT
ERRORS
Chapter 3 dealt with the information-theoretic cryptanalysis of a classic cipher when
symbols of ciphertext are erased in the wiretap channel. Although the techniques may
lead to greater understanding of other more modern ciphers in a noisy ciphertext set-
ting, we also wish to deal with more practical scenarios directly. In this chapter, we
look into the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers, and evaluate the enhancement to secu-
rity that can be gained when the ciphertext is error prone by analyzing specific attack
algorithms. The stream ciphers that we investigate here have a keystream generator
that is based on linear-feedback shift registers (LFSRs). It is well known that this
class of ciphers is susceptible to certain correlation attacks [42] that exploit the linear
structure of the keystream along with correlations within the keystream generator.
However, we wish to characterize the security of these ciphers when the ciphertext
obtained by an attacker is error prone. We show that two classes of correlation attacks
can still be implemented with essentially no changes to the attack algorithms in this
setting, although with limited effectiveness. The degeneration of the potency of these
attacks is given as a function of the error rate in the ciphertext, and is characterized
using computational security. Of course, as we gain understanding of the required
error rates in ciphertext to cause attacks against stream ciphers to fail, we can use
this knowledge to design practical physical-layer security codes. The addition of such
codes has the ability to make weak cryptosystems strong, and strong cryptosystems
even stronger, by increasing the entropy of the attacker’s knowledge of the ciphertext
E. The material in this chapter is drawn from the published works in [6, 7, 8].
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4.1 Background
Prior to the introductory discussion on stream ciphers, we must first present the
binary symmetric channel, a metric called the Hamming distance, and a basic building
block of pseudorandom sequences called the linear-feedback shift register (LFSR).
4.1.1 Binary Symmetric Channel
The binary symmetric channel (BSC) is perhaps the simplest channel model that
takes errors into account. The model is depicted in Figure 9. Here we see that bits
at the input are flipped by the channel with probability p, and transmitted error free
with probability (1 − p). Although this model seems simplistic, it actually captures
the essence of many real channels when hard bit decisions are made at the receiver
[13]. The BSC will be used to model correlations in bit streams, and error rates across









Figure 9: Binary symmetric channel model.
4.1.2 Hamming Distance
The following definition is borrowed from [12].
Definition 10. The Hamming distance between a sequence xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and





[xi 6= yi], (49)
37
where
[xi 6= yi] =

1 if xi 6= yi
0 if xi = yi.
The notion of Hamming distance will be important when we start to discuss attack
strategies for stream ciphers.
4.1.3 Linear-Feedback Shift Registers
An LFSR is nothing more than a binary shift register that produces an output bit
with each shift of the register. To add a pseudorandom quality to the output of the
register, bits in the register can either be fed back or fed forward with connections to
specific bit slots in the register. For this chapter, we will assume that connections feed
back into the register as shown in Figure 10. The feedback connections of an LFSR
can be specified in polynomial form using a connection polynomial. The polynomial
takes the form of
g(x) = g0 + g1x+ g2x
2 + · · ·+ gνxν , (50)
where ν is the order of the polynomial (also the length of the associating LFSR) and
gj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 0, 1, . . . , ν. Feedback connections appear only at those locations in
the register where gj = 1. Thus, the connection polynomial for the LFSR in Figure
10 is g(x) = 1 + x+ x4.
D D D D
g4g1g0
Figure 10: Linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) with connection polynomial g(x) =
1 + x+ x4, with nonzero feedback coefficients labeled.
The D blocks are delays in the register, and can be implemented in practice using
D flip flops. Typically, g(x) in a cryptographic keystream generator is chosen such that
the pseudorandom output sequence is of maximal length before repeating. Consider
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the state of an LFSR to be defined by the contents of the register. Since each position
in the register can hold either a zero or a one, we may jump to the conclusion that
a maximal-length output sequence would be one that would traverse all possible 2ν
states of the LFSR. However, the all-zero state causes the LFSR to always output
zeros, and therefore, is not part of a maximal-length sequence. Thus, an LFSR output
sequence can be at most 2ν − 1 bits long before repeating. A connection polynomial
that produces a maximal-length sequence is a primitive polynomial over GF (2), that
is, the Galois field with two elements (zero and one). For more on this subject, the
interested reader is referred to [12] or a suitable textbook on abstract algebra. The
connection polynomial of the LFSR in Figure 10 is primitive.
4.1.4 LFSR-Based Stream Ciphers
During the 1970s, stream ciphers were introduced as an approximation to the one-
time pad. Initially, they were thought to be quite secure. After all, it was already
known, thanks to Shannon, that the one-time pad could offer perfect secrecy as was
outlined in Section 2.3.1. The encryption technique takes as inputs the length-n
binary message Mn = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn), and a keystream K
n = (K1, K2, . . . , Kn),
and calculates the ciphertext as
Ei = Mi ⊕Ki (51)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, to form En = (E1, E2, . . . , En), where ⊕ signifies the XOR opera-
tion. Note this is identical to (3), the one-time pad encryption rule. The decryption
rule is symmetric to the encryption rule, just as in the one-time pad. Bob also has
access to Kn, and then calculates
Mi = Ei ⊕Ki (52)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The difference between the one-time pad and a stream cipher of
the 1970’s can be seen in the keystream Kn. The one-time pad required that Kn be
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uniformly random, whereas the more practical stream cipher requires only a random
seed, and then generates a pseudorandom sequence Kn from that seed. The stream
ciphers we will analyze in this chapter have a common keystream generator structure
that is pictured in Figure 11. The keystream Kn is generated using β distinct LFSR
output sequences as inputs to some combining function f(·). Examples of some well-













Figure 11: Keystream generator based on linear-feedback shift registers.
The true secret key of the cipher is comprised of the initial contents of each of the
shift registers, and sometimes the connection polynomials of the LFSRs as well. It was
shown that if the output streams of the LFSRs were combined in a linear fashion, the
key could be found quite easily assuming a small amount of known plaintext, using e.g.
the Berlekamp-Massey shift register synthesis algorithm [45]. However, even using
non-linear combining functions, the output sequence An of a single LFSR, say the ith
one, and the keystream generator output Kn might be correlated in such a system
[46]. This correlation was first exploited in an attack on the cipher by Siegenthaler
in 1985 using only ciphertext [47]. The result was an attack that had drastically
reduced complexity compared to a brute-force attack. Known plaintext attacks soon
followed with even faster attack algorithms that were duly named fast correlation
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attacks. The first two such algorithms were published by Meier and Staffelbach in
1989 [48]. Others followed including [49] and [50]. These attacks commonly treat only
the initial contents of the LFSRs as the secret key and assume that the connection
polynomials for all LFSRs are common knowledge. Although Siegenthaler produced
the first correlation attack, he also strengthened stream ciphers of this nature by
developing the notion of correlation-immune combining functions [42]. Additional
criteria in the design of f(·) that reduce the effectiveness of fast correlation attacks
are provided in [48].
Clearly much is known regarding this family of ciphers, and attacks against them
are well developed. Therefore, LFSR-based stream ciphers provide an ideal backdrop
on which to cast the notion of physical-layer security as a cryptographic enhancement.
We will take a similar approach as in Chapter 3 to modeling the effects of physical-
layer security coding, assuming a positive error rate over the wiretap channel Qw.
The main channel Qm will once again be assumed to be noiseless for the sake of the
analysis. It should be noted that this problem could potentially be cast as a learning
parity with noise (LPN) problem. The interested reader is referred to the following
sources for more information [51, 52, 53].
We also adjust the cryptanalysis to a slightly more practical methodology. Rather
than solving for equivocations of message and key, here we choose to evaluate known
attacks against stream ciphers. It will be shown that LFSR-based stream ciphers,
although generally susceptible to certain fast correlation attacks, can be made secure
against two classes of known attacks through exploiting noise in an eavesdropper’s
channel, or more precisely, we show the required error rate in Qw to reduce specific
fast correlation attacks to brute force attacks, thus removing any advantage an at-
tacker may derive from correlation. This requires an understanding of specific fast
correlation attacks.
41
4.1.5 Outline of Chapter
Regarding the remainder of the chapter, in Section 4.2 we provide the details of two
fast correlation attacks that were among the earliest of the fast-correlation variety. It
will then be shown how to analyze the effectiveness of these attacks when allowing for
the possibility of corrupt ciphertext in Section 4.3. Oddly, we will see that the con-
cept of noisy ciphertext changes only a single parameter in the noise-free ciphertext
cryptanalysis. The Attack 2 algorithm reveals the secret key, or initial contents of a
shift register, iteratively. For this attack, we apply the tool of extrinsic information
transfer (EXIT) charts to show the expected attack progression and outcome. EXIT
charts were designed to give a graphical understanding and portrayal of iterative de-
coders in turbo codes [54, 55], and have been used to provide insight on low-density
parity-check (LDPC) decoding as well [12]. The authors of [56] show deeper analysis
on the topic of EXIT curves and expound on information-theoretical implications of
EXIT charts. For our purposes, EXIT chart analysis gives a clear indication when
attacks are expected to fail and when they are expected to succeed as a function
of system and channel parameters. We provide two ways of forming EXIT curves
to chart the progression of Attack 2 in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, using only hard deci-
sion information, and then using soft decision information, respectively. We finally
summarize the findings of the chapter in Section 4.6
4.2 Correlation Attacks
The main assumption of fast correlation attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers is
that the encryption technique shown in Figure 11 can be modeled as a single LFSR
output sequence An with a following BSC with crossover probability p1 to produce
the keystream Kn. This simplified keystream generator model is depicted in Figure
12, and implies that An and Kn are correlated such that Pr(Aj = Kj) = 1− p1∀j.









Figure 12: Simplified model of the keystream generator assumed in fast correlation
attacks.
of each of the β distinct LFSRs in the keystream generator one at a time. The
attacks rely on the structure of An, and thus can be applied, although imperfectly, to
Kn.1 Recall that An is not truly random, but rather pseudorandom. Checksums, or
simply checks, that exist in An are explicit in the connection polynomial g(x) of its
associating LFSR. Let t be one less than the number of nonzero coefficients in g(x),
and denote the indices of the nonzero coefficients as j0, j1, . . . , jt. Then the following
expression holds in An for any j as long as all the indices are less than n
Aj+j0 + Aj+j1 + · · ·+ Aj+jt = 0. (53)
We can solve this expression for any single bit in An as
Aj+ju = Aj+j0 + Aj+j1 + · · ·+ Aj+ju−1 + Aj+ju+1 + · · ·+ Aj+jt . (54)
Almost every bit in An takes part in t + 1 checks of this kind. Only the bits on the
ends of the sequence appear in less.
Let us also take the connection polynomial and square the entire expression. The
structure of the LFSR is such that the resulting polynomial g2(x) will also express
a check that holds in An. In fact, we can take successive square of g(x) to form as
many checks as possible until we overrun the length of the datastream available n
[48]. One may initially feel that squaring these polynomials will prove a cumbersome
1Note that the idea of noisy ciphertext is akin to this attack technique where the keystream Kn
is assumed to be a noisy version of An.
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task, but since these squaring operation are completed in GF (2), we may use the rule
of freshman exponentiation, given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Theorem 5.15 in [12]). If x and y are elements in a field of characteristic
p,
(x+ y)p = xp + yp.
This applies as well to polynomials with coefficients over a field of characteristic p,
where the characteristic of a field is the smallest number of ones that add to zero in
the field. In GF (2), p = 2, and squares can, therefore, be easily calculated to provide
additional checksums in An.
Example 1. Let g(x) = 1 + x + x4. Then g2(x) = 1 + x2 + x8, (g2(x))2 = g4(x) =
1+x4 +x16, etc. These three expressions denote the following checksums in the output
sequence An of the associating LFSR: Aj + Aj+1 + Aj+4 = 0, Aj + Aj+2 + Aj+8 = 0,
and Aj +Aj+4 +Aj+16 = 0. Each check can be applied to any j, so long as the highest
index in a check is less than n, the length of the output sequence.
Define w as the total number of checks involving the bit Aj, and enumerate these
checks from one to w. We now apply check expressions to bits in Kn. Let the vth
check be
Kj = Kv1 +Kv2 + · · ·+Kvt . (55)






Lv = Kj +Bv. (57)










which is the probability of an even number of bit flips in the bits {Kv1 , Kv2 , . . . , Kvt}.
It can be shown that S = S(t− 1) in the recursive calculation
S(i) = (1− p1)S(i− 1) + p1(1− S(i− 1)) (59)
where S(0) = 1− p1. Now suppose that exactly h of the w checks involving Aj hold
in Kn. Without loss of generality, let checks enumerated one through h hold. Then
we can define
P ∗j = Pr (Kj = Aj|L1 = · · · = Lh = 0, Lh+1 = · · · = Lw = 1)
=
(1− p1)Sh(1− S)w−h
(1− p1)Sh(1− S)w−h + p1(1− S)hSw−h
. (60)
Therefore, P ∗j is the probability that Kj equals Aj given all we know about the
checksums involving Kj.
Since attacks on this system are known plaintext attacks, we will now use n to
signify the number of bits in M known to the attacker. Although eventually we
will add a physical-layer component to this system, let us assume for now that an
attacker has the ciphertext Ei = Mi ⊕ Ki exactly for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The attacker
then calculates
Ki = Ei ⊕Mi (61)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n to obtain Kn. Performing the calculation in (60) for these n bits
in Kn, we form the vector (P∗)n = (P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , . . . , P
∗
n) [48]. The two fast correlation
known-plaintext attacks are now briefly summarized. For additional details, please
see [48].
4.2.1 Attack 1
The first attack from [48] is noniterative and was motivated by the intuitive notion
that those bits in the keystream Kn that are included in the greatest number of
correct checks are more likely to be equal to their corresponding bits in An. Consider
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that each bit in An is a linear combination of the bit values in the initial state of
the LFSR, which make up the part of the secret key allocated to the ith LFSR.
Therefore, it is possible to solve for this portion of the secret key using ν bits with
linearly independent secret key bit combinations.
An attacker selects the ν most reliable bits from Kn, i.e., the ν bits with the highest
corresponding values in (P∗)n, that form a linearly independent system of equations.
Of course if one or more of these ν bits are in error, then the system of equations
will not return the secret key as its solution. The correctness of the solution can be
determined by the attacker using a threshold comparison with a correlation metric
[47]. In essence this means testing out the proposed initial conditions to recover an
estimate of An, say Ân. Then the Hamming distance
dH(Â
n,Kn) (62)
should indicate a rough percentage of p1 bits differing between these two sequences.
It is actually a trivial matter for the attacker to estimate the channel parameter p1 by
counting correct checks in Kn. For our analysis, we wish to consider the worst case for
the legitimate parties by assuming the attacker is always able to determine whether
the key obtained is correct or incorrect. If the key is incorrect, then the values of
the ν bits with the highest values in (P∗)n are toggled trying alternate bit sequences
in order of ascending Hamming distance to the original guess until the correct key is
obtained.
4.2.2 Attack 2
The second attack given in [48] calculates iterative updates between S and (P∗)n,
and employs two nested levels of iteration. In a particular round of the attack, the
algorithm performs multiple iterations. The update calculation for S in (59) is made
unique for each bit-check combination. There are roughly w checks for each of n bits,
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total checks with t + 1 bits in each check. Hence, we construct a matrix S(t+1)×w
′
to store these values. Consider the check in (54) and call it the vth check. Let
(q0, q1, . . . , qt−1) = (p
∗
j+j0





, . . . , p∗j+jt), respectively. Then the
value in S(t+1)×w
′
corresponding to the uth bit of the vth check is Su,v(t − 1) and is
calculated recursively as
Su,v(i) = qiSu,v(i− 1) + (1− qi)(1− Su,v(i− 1)) (64)
where Su,v(0) = q0. Prior to iteration p
∗
thr and nthr are calculated to act as decision
thresholds. The calculations are based on an optimization of expected correction in
the first iteration of the first round.
Each iteration computes S(t+1)×w
′
and (P∗)n using (64) and (60) respectively,
although care must be taken in applying (60), as specific values from S(t+1)×w
′
must
be incorporated into the calculation.2 The first calculation of S(t+1)×w
′
assumes P ∗j =
1− p1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Again, an attacker can estimate the channel parameter p1
by counting correct checks in En, as previously mentioned in Section 4.2.1. If after
an iteration there are greater than nthr elements of (P
∗)n such that P ∗j < pthr, then
the round is terminated. A round consists of a maximum of α iterations. At the end
of the round, all bits Kj with corresponding P
∗
j < pthr, are flipped. All values in
(P∗)n are then reset to 1−p1, and the attack proceeds again with new calculations in
S(t+1)×w
′
. The attack proceeds in this fashion until it either stagnates, or converges
to the correct solution.3
2Perhaps a helpful mental picture would be that of a Tanner graph in a belief propagation
decoding scheme. Certain values in S(t+1)×w
′
pertain to certain bits (P∗)n values, and the graph
can be built so that only neighboring nodes can affect a calculation for another node.

























Figure 13: System model depicting a known plaintext attack against the LFSR-based
stream cipher system when physical-layer security coding maintains a nonzero BER
p2 in Eve’s ciphertext Ê.
4.3 Noisy Ciphertext Analysis
For this section, we assume the system model shown in Figure 13, where the encoder,
decoder, and feedback in Figure 5 are assumed to provide an effectively noiseless
main channel and a positive error rate in the wiretap channel. The error rate in Qw is
modeled in Figure 13 as a BSC with probability of a bit flip p2. Of course this implies
hard decision output from Eve’s decoder, and also that errors occur independently in
Eve’s noisy ciphertext Ên.
The cipher in Figure 13 is the stream cipher with an LFSR-based keystream
generator presented previously in Figure 11, where encryption and decryption rules
were already given in (51) and (52), respectively. Note, we have assumed the simplified
model of this keystream generator from Figure 12, and therefore, the output sequence
of the ith LFSR An is assumed to be correlated with the keystream Kn such that
Pr(Ai = Ki) = 1− p1 (65)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Bob has access to the keystream Kn through an identical keystream
generator as the one maintained by Alice, and therefore, since Qm is noiseless, he is
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able to perform the symmetric decryption operation without error to obtain Mn.
Since Eve does not initially possess Kn, she must attack the cipher. Physical-layer
security codes are assumed to render her stricken with an average bit error rate (BER)
of p2 in her ciphertext Ê
n; however, the figure also shows that Eve has access to some
plaintext. We assume that exactly n bits of plaintext are known to her, and hence
treat all data sequences as length-n sequences in the known plaintext attacks from
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
The attacks in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, originally from [48], exhibit a convenient
property for noisy ciphertext cryptanalysis. We can actually address the notion of
noisy ciphertext within the current parameters of the attacks with no change to the
attack algorithms. It should be noted once again that the goal of these attacks is to
recover the secret key, which is comprised of the initial contents of each LFSR in the
keystream generator. The initial contents of the ith LFSR are trivial to deduce from
the complete sequence An.
Let us assume that the BSC in Qw produces an error sequence N
n, where Ni = 1
when a bit is flipped in the sequence. Then
Êi = Ei ⊕Ni (66)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. When Eve applies her knowledge of the plaintext to her noisy
ciphertext Ên, she calculates
Êi ⊕Mi = (Ki ⊕Mi ⊕Ni)⊕Mi
= Ki ⊕Ni. (67)
Clearly this result indicates that the error rate in Qw serves to confuse Eve about K
n
when she has access to the plaintext. Let us call Eve’s noisy keystream
K̂n = Kn ⊕Nn, (68)
where, of course, the XOR operation is performed bit-wise. Then Figure 14 shows the
effective progression of data sequences from An to K̂n. The keystream Kn is obtained
49
from An through a BSC where Pr (Kj 6= Aj) = p1, and the noisy keystream sequence
K̂n is obtained by Kn through a BSC where Pr(K̂j 6= Kj) = p2. Thus, a further
simplification can occur in the modeling of the relationship between An and K̂n by
combining the two cascaded BSCs into a single BSC with Pr (K̂j 6= Aj) = p′. This
model is shown in Figure 15, and is coincidentally the same model for attacking the
system when the error-free ciphertext is known by the attacker. The one difference
is the value of p′. When there are no errors in the ciphertext, p′ = p1. With a noisy
Qw, however, p
′ takes on a different value. It is trivial to show that
p′ = p1(1− p2) + p2(1− p1)
= p1 + p2 − 2p1p2. (69)














Figure 15: Effective known-plaintext attack model relating the two sequences An
and K̂n.
4.3.1 Mutual Information at the Eavesdropper
Let us briefly analyze the mutual information between a bit in An and its corre-
sponding bit in K̂n. The entropy of the portion of the secret key allocated to the ith
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LFSR is at most ν bits because the order of g(x)—and the length of the associat-
ing LFSR—is ν; and thus, the entropy of the keystream Kn is also at most ν bits.
Applying Shannon’s result shown in (5) in Section 2.3.1 reveals that
H(An) ≤ H(Kn) ≤ ν. (70)
Therefore, an attacker needs only to obtain at most ν bits of information about An to
theoretically be able to solve for the secret key. Let us examine how much information
about An an attacker can theoretically extract from the error-prone version of the
keystream K̂n. Using the single BSC model with parameter p′ we obtain [13, pg.187]
I(An; K̂n) = H(K̂n)−H(K̂n|An)
= H(K̂n)− nH(p′)
≤ n (1−H(p′)) , (71)
where equality holds if An were truly random with equally likely i.i.d. bit realizations,
rather than just pseudorandom. The binary entropy function
H(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2 1− p (72)
takes its maximum value of one when p = 0.5 [13]. Thus, not surprisingly, as p′ → 0.5
in our system, then I(An; K̂n) → 0, which—as we will show—effectively reduces
Attack 1 to a brute-force attack.
4.3.2 Security Enhancement for Attack 1
An estimate for the expected number of trials needed for Attack 1 to succeed was
originally derived in [48], and refined in [6]. Suppose Attack 1 is used to attack a
system where Eve can only obtain noisy ciphertext and has access to some plaintext.
The attack executes normally, as outlined in Section 4.2.1, but with 1 − p′ as the
correlation between An and K̂n. Recall that the original attack also assumes the
setup in Figure 15, but since the attacker had error-free ciphertext in the original
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scenario, then p′ = p1. Now with error-prone ciphertext, noise in the wiretap channel
effectively decorrelates the ciphertext with An.
The attack chooses the ν bits with the highest values in (P∗)n that also form a
linearly independent system of equations. The solution to this system of equations
is the portion of the secret key allotted to the ith LFSR. If exactly r of the ν bits
have been flipped by the BSC, then the maximum number of trials required to cycle












Let us name the bound as




In practice r is not known, but it can be estimated. Let w′ be the average number of
checks relevant to any one bit, and h′ be the maximum integer such that ν bits exist
that are expected to satisfy at least h′ checks. Then,














((1− p′)Si(1− S)w′−i + p′(1− S)iSw′−i)
(75)
is an estimate of r, where S is calculated by substituting p′ for p1 in (59). From this
equation we learn that r̄ of the ν chosen bits are expected to be in error. An estimate
on the order of the number of trials required is then given by




In Figure 16, we plot φ̄(ν, r̄) for several p2 values over the range of p1, using (69) to
calculate p′ as a function of p1 and p2. The results in Figure 16 are for an LFSR with
length ν = 32, t = 6 feedback connections, and n = ν × 106 bits of known plaintext.
Simulated attacks provide some idea as to the accuracy of φ̄(ν, r̄). These are shown
in Figure 17. The expression φ̄(ν, r̄) approximates the simulated result when p′ is close
to zero. When p′ = 0.5, however, then H(r̄/ν) = 1 and φ̄(ν, r̄) = 2H(r̄/ν)ν = 2ν . The
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Figure 16: Expected bound φ̄(ν, r̄) on the number of trials required to find the secret
key using Attack 1 when ν = 32, n = ν × 106, and t = 6.
simulated average at p′ = 0.5 is 2ν−1, one half of φ̄(ν, r̄) when p′ = 0.5, which is also
the average of a straight forward brute-force attack. This result indicates that noise
in the ciphertext has the effect of decorrelating An and K̂n. We also see shifts in the
plot for different values of p2. Clearly, p
′ increases with either p1 or p2, and these
results indicate that as p′ increases, then the expected work for Attack 1 to succeed
must increase as well.





and realize that the bound in (71) can be applied to this quantity as well so that
IAK̂ ≤ 1−H(p
′) = ĪAK̂ . (78)
We can now plot our results as a function of this upper bound on IAK̂ to give us some
idea as to how mutual information scales the effectiveness of cryptographic attacks.
The trends are quite clear, and perhaps expected. As p′ → 0.5, then the upper bounds
on both I(An; K̂n) and IAK̂ go to zero, forcing the mutual information to zero along
with the bounds. When this occurs, the number of required iterations to recover the
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φ̄(ν, r̄): p2 = 0
Simulation: p2 = 0
φ̄(ν, r̄): p2 = 0.15
Simulation: p2 = 0.15
φ̄(ν, r̄): p2 = 0.25
Simulation: p2 = 0.25
Figure 17: Results from simulations of Attack 1 showing necessary computations to
crack the LFSR-based cryptographic system. Here ν = 15, N ′ = 1500, and t = 4.
secret key using Attack 1 goes to 2ν−1, which signifies brute-force complexity. Figure
18 shows the expected number of trials as a function of the bound on per-letter mutual
information when ν = 15, t = 4, and n = 1500.4
4.3.3 Security Enhancement for Attack 2—EXIT Charts
In the case of Attack 1, the bit realizations of the random vector K̂n remain constant
throughout the attack. The information about An imbedded in K̂n is extracted and
combined with knowledge of the structure of An to find the secret key. However, in
Attack 2 the values of bits in K̂n are modified at the end of each round, thus altering
the density on K̂n as the attack progresses. Let (K̂n)[l] be the K̂n sequence after
the bit flipping in round l of Attack 2. Say the attack takes J rounds for (K̂n)[l] to
either stagnate or converge to An. Then an information-theoretic analysis of Attack
2 requires knowledge of I(An; (K̂n)[l]) for l = 0, 1, . . . , J . Since sequences are binary,
we expect the per-letter mutual information between An and (K̂n)[l] to go to one as
l goes to J in a successful attack, and to converge to a value less than one when an
4Here t is small relative to ν for ease in simulation, but these trends extend to larger t.
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Figure 18: Number of trials required for a successful attack versus ĪAK̂ , an upper
bound on the per-letter mutual information between An and K̂n. The order of g(x)
is ν = 15, the number of nonzero coefficients in g(x) is t = 4, and the amount of
known plaintext bits n = 1500.
attack fails.
Actual calculations of I(An; (K̂n)[l]) prove to be difficult, therefore, we will ap-
proximate these values by assuming that bits in An are i.i.d and uniformly dis-
tributed over {0, 1}. We call the mutual information calculated under this assumption












from zero up to J . EXIT analysis provides intuition on the decoding threshold in
terms of BER in the ciphertext by noting the lowest error rate that first introduces
a cross in the plotted intrinsic versus extrinsic information curves. The intrinsic
information can be defined as the information available at the input of a decoding
iteration. The extrinsic information is then defined as the information available at
the output of a decoding iteration. Prior to building EXIT charts, however, we should
note that another technique for anticipating success in Attack 2 was given in [48], by
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determining the expected result of the first iteration of the algorithm. It was observed
that if the first iteration obtains additional information about the keystream, then
eventually the iterative attack converges on the correct data sequence. In other words,
the first step’s outcome seems to be sufficient to estimate the algorithm’s result. We
now calculate the threshold pthr to maximize the probability that K̂j 6= Aj given
that P ∗j < pthr. Let Nw be the expected number of bits such that both K̂j 6= Aj
and P ∗j < pthr, and let Nv be the expected number of bits such that K̂j = Aj and
P ∗j < pthr, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Also, let Ni = Nw − Nv. If Nc0 represents the total
number of bits such that K̂j = Aj prior to any iterations, then the toggling of all bits
with P ∗j < pthr will result in an expected (Nc0 + Ni) correct bits. Obviously if Ni is
negative, then the expected outcome of the first iteration will leave more bits in error
than were originally so, and therefore, according to [48] will cause the attack to fail.
To ensure that the algorithm does not eventually converge on the correct sequence,
it must be guaranteed that Attack 2 has no correction capability. Strictly speaking,
this is a difficult guarantee; however, we will adopt the nomenclature of [48] and say








is used to scale the value of Ni to a real number within the range of [−1, 1] while
maintaining its sign. Figure 19 shows the value of F for several BSC parameters p2,
over a range of p1 values. Simulations of Attack 2 give some evidence that F ≤ 0
is sufficient to predict attack failure; however, results also show that F > 0 is not
sufficient to guarantee attack success.
Example 2. Let the primitive connection polynomial for the ith LFSR be g(x) =
1+x+x2 +x3 +x12 +x21 +x31, and p1 = Pr(Aj 6= Kj) = 0.2. In the first of two cases,
p2 = 0, i.e., the error rate in the wiretap channel is zero. Therefore, p
′ = p1 = 0.2
and F is calculated using (80) to be 0.826. Case two sets p2 = 0.1, meaning the
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Figure 19: Correction ratio F of Attack 2 for ν = 32, N ′ = ν×106, and t = 6. F ≤ 0
indicates that an attack will likely fail.
BER in K̂n is 0.1. Using (69) we calculate p′ = 0.26, and using (80) we find that
F = −0.034. These values of F imply that Attack 2 will succeed in case one and
fail in case two. Actual outcomes of these attacks are shown in Table 1. Case one
does indeed converge to An in 16 rounds, while case two requires 34 rounds before
the algorithm stagnates and fails. Note that in the failed case, most rounds result in
fewer correct bits than the previous round.
4.4 EXIT Charts Based on Hard Decisions
EXIT charts provide a closer look into the information transfer that occurs during
an iterative decoding process, and therefore, can be applied to Attack 2. The first
of two methods for generating EXIT charts for Attack 2 tracks per-letter mutual
information between An and (K̂n)[l] from round to round by assuming bits in An to
be i.i.d. and uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. This is not such a bad assumption for
this attack, since the algorithm recovers the entire sequence An anyway. When we
calculate mutual information under this assumption, we use the notation set forth in
(79). To be clear, we consider elements in An to be realizations of a single random
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Table 1: Simulation results of Attack 2 comparing scenarios with and without added
security from the physical layer. For these simulations, ν = 31, n = ν × 100, t = 6,
and p1 = 0.2.
Case 1: p2 = 0 Case 2: p2 = 0.1
Round Number of Total Number of Total
Index bits flipped correct bits bits flipped correct bits
1 30 2487 1 2276
2 91 2526 3 2277
3 122 2586 6 2277
4 42 2628 8 2275






14 43 3075 2 2204
15 23 3098 100 2164




34 - - 1 2079
35 - - 0 2079
... - - 0 2079
variable A, and elements in (K̂n)[l] to be realizations of a single random variable
K̂ [l]. Then we calculate the per-letter mutual information Ĩ
[l]
AK̂










pAK̂[l](A = a, K̂
[l] = k̂) log2





for rounds from l = 0, 1, . . . , J .
The calculation of Ĩ
[l]
AK̂
requires us to estimate the probability mass function of
K̂ [l], as well as the joint mass function of An and K̂ [l]. Since the channel we are
considering is symmetric, all of this can be done through simulation by counting bits
that are still in error at the end of each round and dividing by the total number




























. Thus the expected progress of the decoder is shown by reflecting
back and forth between curves. If Ĩ
[l]
AK̂
goes to one, then the attack converges on
the correct sequence; therefore, there must exist a gap between the two curves if a
successful attack is to be expected on average.
To show average tendencies in the mutual information during Attack 2 by simula-




for every round in a large number of attacks. Then the expected increase in infor-
mation is obtained for each section of the chart by subdividing the x-axis into ∆
equal segments or bins. The data are sorted according to intrinsic information, and
then the extrinsic information is averaged in each bin. The center of each of the ∆
segments is used as the intrinsic information for the corresponding bin when forming
the chart.
Results using this method for a particular set of system parameters averaged over
100 attacks are shown in Figure 20. For this example, we assume that p2 = 0, and
that the correlation in the keystream generator is such that p1 = 0.2. We observe
that the EXIT chart predicts an overall tendency for the attack to succeed, which is
implied by the gap between curves. We also note that the EXIT curves do not extend
to zero. Generating these curves was implemented through simulating attacks on
the system. Although some rounds did yield a negative correction, none resulted in
zero extrinsic information; therefore, no rounds exhibited zero intrinsic information
either, leaving bins around zero empty. Finally we observe that the gap between
EXIT curves is narrower for lower intrinsic information regimes. This fact defends
the technique used in [48] and [6] in defining the correction capability of Attack 2
using only the expected results in the first round of an attack. If the first round
provides good correction, then the chart indicates that convergence to An is likely
to proceed quickly. When the first round exhibits mediocre or poor correction, the
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algorithm must proceed through the pinched region of the gap resulting in slower
convergence on average.




































Figure 20: EXIT chart with ∆ = 20 formed by averaging the hard-decision output of
100 simulations of Attack 2 with ν = 31, t = 6, α = 5, n = 3100, and p1 = p
′ = 0.2.
Another EXIT chart for a similar setup as that in Figure 20 is shown in Figure
21, the only difference being that p2 = 0.1 in the latter example, while p2 = 0 in the
former example. These two figures are the EXIT charts for the same scenarios as in
Example 2. Figure 21 shows that Attack 2 is likely to fail when p2 = 0.1 because of the
crossover in the EXIT chart. Again this behavior can be predicted from the average
correction in the first round. Figure 21 portrays more errors on average following
the first round than there were prior to launching the attack. In this scenario, the
expected progress of an attack converges on the crossover point in the EXIT chart
rather than converging to one as in Figure 20. The tabulated results from Example 2
showed a similar result. From Figures 20 and 21, we can deduce that a physical-layer
security code that ensures a 10% bit error rate in Eve’s ciphertext is sufficient on
average to prevent Attack 2 from obtaining the secret key.
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Figure 21: EXIT chart with ∆ = 20 formed by averaging the hard-decision output
of 100 simulations of Attack 2 with ν = 31, t = 6, α = 5, n = 3100, p1 = 0.2, and
p2 = 0.1 yielding p
′ = 0.26.
4.5 EXIT Charts Based on Densities
The second technique for generating EXIT charts requires the use of message-passing
parameters and estimating densities of continuous random variables [23, 12]. If we
consider the attack in terms of its underlying bipartite graph G, we let check nodes
comprise the vertices of one bipartition, and bit nodes comprise the vertices of the
other bipartition. A check node is adjacent to a bit node if and only if the check ex-
pression includes that particular bit. In practice only values from (P∗)n and S(t+1)×w
′
are passed between bit nodes and check nodes at each iteration, but to track the
mutual information at each iteration, we must form useful probability measures. We
adopt the notion of using likelihood differentials similar to those used in LDPC mes-
sage passing [23]. Suppose the algorithm requires L total iterations to converge, i.e.,
L is the sum of the iterations in all J rounds required for convergence. Let S[l] and
(P∗)[l] denote the values of S(t+1)×w
′
and (P∗)n, respectively, after the update in the
lth iteration, where the superscripts indicating size are omitted from the new notation
for practicality. Consider the uth bit of the vth check, where the vth check is given
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by (54). Then the messages being passed from check nodes to bit nodes along the
edges of G are calculated using (64), and are given as
δS[l]u,v = Pr (Aj+ju = 0|(P∗)[l−1])− Pr (Aj+ju = 1|(P∗)[l−1])
=

(1− S[l]u,v)− S[l]u,v if V = 1
S
[l]







Note that S[0] is calculated using (59) where p′ is substituted for p1. The algorithm
then calculates (P∗)[0] using (60) and the information in S[0], and passes back along
the edges of the bipartite graph new bit to check information messages
δ(P ∗)
[l]
j = Pr (Aj = 0|S[l])− Pr (Aj = 1|S[l])
=

(1− (P ∗j )[l])− (P ∗j )[l] if K̂j = 1
(P ∗j )
[l] − (1− (P ∗j )[l]) if K̂j = 0
(84)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and for l = 0, 1, . . . , L.
To form the EXIT chart, we once again calculate per-letter mutual information as
discussed in Section 4.3.3, and adhere to the notation set forth in (79). Therefore, A is
modeled as a random variable with i.i.d. uniformly distributed realizations on {0, 1},
and the entries of An are assumed to be realizations of A. Also, δS[l] is a random
variable that governs the continuous distribution on values in δS[l]. The per-letter
mutual information between A and δS[l] will be denoted as
Ĩ
[l]
A,δS = I(A; δS
[l]). (85)
Likewise, let δ(P ∗)[l] be a random variable that governs the distribution over all entries
in δ(P∗)[l]. We will denote per-letter mutual information between A and δ(P ∗)[l] as
Ĩ
[l]
A,δP ∗ = I(A; δ(P
∗)[l]) (86)
62
for l = 0, 1, . . . , L. Therefore, we must solve for mutual information between a discrete
binary random variable A, and continuous random variables δS[l] and δ(P ∗)[l]. From
[12], if A is discrete over the alphabet A and B is a continuous random variable over










































A,δP ∗ can be calculated. If we assumed further that the distributions
of δS[l] and δ(P ∗)[l] were Gaussian, then we could solve for a closed-form expression;
however, histograms of these data appear to be Gaussian only in the first iteration of
each round in the fast-correlation attack. Therefore, the mutual information calcula-
tions are performed numerically using histograms as estimates of density functions.
This type of EXIT chart takes into account the individual iterations in each round,
rather than just the hard decisions following the rounds. Bit adjustments introduce
abrupt changes in the mutual information, and thus affect the shape of the EXIT
chart. To provide smooth curves, a length-two finite impulse response averaging filter
is convolved with the data and the binning technique mentioned in Section ?? is
implemented on the filtered data.









A,δP ∗ , thus
vertical lines in the expected path through the chart represent the information transfer
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between check nodes and bit nodes in the same iteration, and horizontal lines represent
the information transfer between the bit nodes of the current iteration and the check
nodes of the next iteration [12].
Examples of EXIT charts generated using this second method are now presented
using the same LFSR as before, with connection polynomial g(x) = 1 +x+x2 +x3 +
x12 +x21 +x31. Again, α = 5, n = 3100, and t = 6. We also set p1 = 0.2 implying that
Pr (aj = kj) = 0.8. Let us consider again the case where p2 = 0 yielding p
′ = 0.2, and
compare it to the case where p2 = 0.05 yielding p
′ = 0.23. Plots are given in Figures 22
and 23, respectively. Since this method takes into account each iteration, it therefore
requires more steps to traverse the expected path in Figure 22. The crossover point
in Figure 23 indicates that the attack will have an inclination to stagnate, and thus
fail to obtain the sequence An when p′ = 0.23. In these examples a mere five percent
error rate is required to alter the expected behavior of the attack.






































Figure 22: EXIT chart with ∆ = 15 formed by averaging soft-decision output of 100
simulations of Attack 2 with ν = 31, t = 6, α = 5, n = 3100, p1 = 0.2, and p2 = 0,
yielding p′ = 0.2.
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Figure 23: EXIT chart with ∆ = 15 formed by averaging soft-decision output of 100
simulations of Attack 2 with ν = 31, t = 6, α = 5, n = 3100, p1 = 0.2, and p2 = 0.05
yielding p′ = 0.23. The viewable range is adjusted to show the crossover point.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the effectiveness of known attacks against LFSR-based
stream ciphers when an eavesdropper has access to error-prone ciphertext and known
plaintext. The wiretap channel was modeled as a BSC with a certain probability of
bit errors occurring randomly in the channel. It was observed that in known plaintext
attacks, noisy ciphertext directly implies noisy keystream data. Solving for a specific
output sequence of one of the LFSRs that makes up the keystream generator is then
made more difficult because of the uncertainty in the keystream.
We showed that this analysis changed only a single parameter in fast-correlation
attacks against this system, because the attack assumes an effective BSC separating
a specific LFSR output sequence in the keystream generator and the true keystream.
That assumption of correlation allowed us to incorporate additional confusion from
error rates in the wiretap channel.
The end results were expressions for understanding the necessary error rates in
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ciphertext to drive Attack 1 to a brute-force attack, and causing the iterative algo-
rithm in Attack 2 to fail completely. We analyzed parameters of these attacks that
indicate their effectiveness when ciphertext was error prone. We also applied the tool
of EXIT charts to verify the results for Attack 2. For this attack, a small bit-error
rate, say 5% was shown to effectively shut down the convergence of the attack in
some cases. It should be pointed out that the physical-layer security codes we will
present in Chapter 5 will far exceed these error rates in the eavesdropper’s ciphertext
for almost all configurations of channel parameters when an eavesdropper may expe-
rience packet losses in data transmission. The findings of this chapter imply that if
physical-layer security codes can be used against eavesdroppers to impart even small
error rates in the eavesdropper’s obtained ciphertext, then stream ciphers can enjoy
a security enhancement from the physical layer.
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CHAPTER V
STOPPING SET CODES FOR PHYSICAL-LAYER
SECURITY
Physical-layer security coding has the potential to enhance cryptographic protocols
by hiding the ciphertext from potential attackers. However, the problem of combined
physical-layer security with cryptography requires two problems to be solved. The
first problem of cryptanalysis of error-prone ciphertext was addressed in Chapters
3 and 4. This chapter addresses the second problem of developing practical codes
that offer physical-layer security. As was seen in Chapter 4, some ciphers can be
made much stronger if we can design codes that guarantee even a small error rate in
an eavesdropper’s observed ciphertext. The codes presented here are based on low-
density parity-check codes, and exploit a point of failure in message passing decoding
called stopping sets, for security. Much of the material in this chapter has been
published in [9, 10, 11].
5.1 Motivation and Outline
This chapter provides a new encoder design that looks at offering legitimate par-
ties security, even if system parameters are unknown during the design phase of the
codes. The encoder aims to provide a blanket of security that covers almost ev-
ery conceivable set of channel parameters over the packet erasure wiretap channel
model. The security analysis calculates the probability density function on D, a
random variable that represents the number of degrees of freedom that exist in an
eavesdropper’s information about the ciphertext. Degrees of freedom were previously
introduced in Section 2.5.2.3. There it was pointed out that computational security
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and information-theoretic security can be addressed using D. In this chapter, com-
putational security is shown to grow as E[1
2
(2D + 1)] for our binary codes. We will
also show that E[D] is equal to the equivocation for the prescribed encoder.
Our encoder alleviates the shortcomings of many practical physical-layer security
codes, as discussed in Section 2.5.2.2. The design is robust to varying channel param-
eters, imperfect channel state information (CSI) at the encoder, and non-degraded
system models. In fact, the family of codes that we have designed even offer security
enhancement to cryptography when attackers have an advantage in signal quality
over legitimate receivers. The scheme initially assumes erasure events over Qm and
Qw are statistically independent, and relies on a nonsystematic LDPC code design,
with puncturing and interleaving steps in the encoder. Legitimate receivers employ
automatic repeat-request (ARQ) for reliability through an authenticated public feed-
back channel. Finally, the scheme requires no secret key and no rate reduction in
data transmission.
The system model is given in Section 5.2, while the background for low-density
parity-check codes and stopping sets is discussed in Section 5.3. End-to-end details
of the encoder (Section 5.4) and decoder (Section 5.5) are provided. Design criteria
are also specified to maximize the degrees of freedom in the maximum-likelihood
attack as well as the message-passing attack. The security analysis is then given
in Section 5.6, which includes bounds on the increase in computational secrecy of
an underlying cryptosystem, as well as extensions to cover broadcast scenarios with
multiple receivers and multiple collaborative attackers. We examine the case where
packet erasures are correlated across Qm and Qw in Section 5.7. Ultimately, we
investigate the error rates in the ciphertext when the encoder provides security in
Section 5.8, and include some discussion of the material in the chapter in Section 5.9.
68
5.2 System Model and Degrees of Freedom
We begin by reducing the combined coding and cryptographic system shown in Fig-
ure 5 to only the essential pieces for this problem. The wiretap channel model [4]
with feedback is shown in Figure 24. In this model, the input message is binary,
compressed, and encrypted and is labeled E in the figure. In fact, all signals will be
binary in this chapter. It will be helpful to think of the encrypted message as being
broken up into L blocks of length k, where k is called the dimension of the encoder,
and indicates that the block encoder presented in this chapter encodes k bits at a
time. Let us continue our trends in notation, and define
EkL = (Ek1,E
k




Eki = (E(i−1)k+1, E(i−1)k+2, . . . , Eik). (91)
To avoid some of the cumbersome aspects of this notation, we will sometimes simply
write E to indicate the entire input message. Other signals in the system model
follow the same guidelines. As a guide to this notation, recall from Section 2.1 that
the superscripts on bold capital letters signify the length of the random vector, while
subscripts indicate indices. Since the bits of the message are modeled as random, we
denote them with capital letters as well. A realization of a random vector Eki must
come from Ek, the alphabet of all binary length-k vectors. Let n be the blocklength
of the encoder. Then the coding rate is k/n. Since E was compressed prior to
encryption, all possible k-length bit combinations from Ek are equally likely for the
blocks Eki when i = 1, 2, . . . , L.
The encoder design will be discussed at length in Section 5.4, but as a precursor,
the encoder outputs packets. Each packet possesses α bits from L different input
blocks of data. Thus, the size of each packet is αL. Define η to be the number of
transmitted packets so that XηαL = (XαL1 ,X
αL
2 , . . . ,X
αL
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Figure 24: Wiretap channel model with feedback assuming packet erasure channels
for both the main channel Qm and the wiretap channel Qw.
main channel Qm and the wiretap channel Qw. The two channels are packet erasure
channels (PECs) throughout this chapter, where packets are erased randomly with
probability δ in Qm, and with probability ε in Qw. The output collection of packets
from Qm is called Y and the output collection of packets from Qw is called Z. Finally,
the decoder takes the received packets and generates an estimate on E, which we call
Ẽ for Bob, and Ê for Eve.
Notice that there are no restrictions on ε. In fact, Qw may be of higher quality
than Qm in this model. However, the feedback channel will more than compensate
for most scenarios when Eve has an advantage of channel quality. The encoder and
decoder exploit the independent nature of erased packets across Qm and Qw (although
it will be shown that the design can still be effective with correlated erasures). Of
course, the system must guarantee that Ẽ = E, while at the same time making Eve
as ignorant as possible. The authenticated feedback channel available to Bob plays
a key role in accomplishing both of these endeavors. This public noiseless channel is
used to request the retransmission of erased packets. Since it is authenticated, Alice
is able to deduce whether Bob sent the request, and can detect any tampering with
the data [14], thus restricting Eve to passive status [57]. Requests by Bob are public,
and there is no secret key employed at the physical layer. The sole source of confusion
for Eve is her own naturally occurring erasure pattern across Qw.
Cryptographic attacks often assume an attacker has the luxury of an error-free
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version of E (or even some of the plaintext), but our design aims to prevent this from
occurring, by creating degrees of freedom in the attacker’s knowledge of E by means
of physical-layer security.
Definition 11. The number of degrees of freedom in a received codeword is a random
variable D that takes on the number of encoded symbols for which an eavesdropper
has no information. Therefore, the probabilities of all symbol values on these D
symbols are equally likely.
For binary codes with D = d, the decoder will determine 2d equally likely code-
words of length n, each mapping to a unique k-bit encrypted message in Ek. Since we
assume that the attacker knows the encoder, the maximum value of D is k because a
block in E has k information bits associated with it and an eavesdropper can, at least
in theory, reproduce the codeword with k bits of information. We equated k degrees
of freedom in a block encoder such as this to the notion of perfect secrecy in Section
2.5.2.3. Therefore, degrees of freedom are similar to the information-theoretic secrecy
metric of general equivocation, which we will define in this chapter to be H(X|Z). In
fact, if we have D degrees of freedom in k bits, and the other k −D bits are known
perfectly, then the entropy of the block is exactly D bits. Since an attacker has no
knowledge of the bits associated with the D degrees of freedom, the average number
of guesses required to obtain them is equal to the mean of a discrete uniform random




(2D + 1)] =
1
2
(E[2D] + 1) (92)
guesses must be made on average to resolve D degrees of freedom. Using this reason-
ing, the goals of our physical-layer design are as follows: first, to ensure that D = 0
for Bob so that Ẽ = E; second, to make D as large as possible for Eve; and third, to
ensure that attacks on the cryptogram fail if the Hamming distance
dH(Ê,E) > 0. (93)
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5.3 LDPC Codes and Stopping Sets
We employ low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [23], and exploit the phenomenon
of stopping sets in our encoder design. This section introduces the codes and their
properties.
5.3.1 LDPC Codes
Let us define a general binary LDPC code C with blocklength n′, and dimension k.
Note that this k is identical to k from section 5.2, but n′ the blocklength of the LDPC
code, is different from n the blocklength of the encoder. Later, we will discuss the
role of puncturing in our encoder to reduce the effective blocklength from n′ to n.
The parity check matrix H(n
′−k)×n′ fully defines the code. We will find it helpful to
think of H(n
′−k)×n′ in terms of its corresponding Tanner graph GC [12, 58]. The set
of variable nodes is
V = (v1, v2, . . . , vn′), (94)
while the set of check nodes is
U = (u1, u2, . . . , un′−k). (95)
Variable nodes correspond to the n′ bits in a codeword, and to columns in H(n
′−k)×n′ .
Checks correspond to rows in H(n
′−k)×n′ , where the set of bits that participate in the
check ui is denoted [12]
Ni = {j : Hi,j = 1}. (96)




vj = 0. (97)
The notation Ni,j signifies all bits in the ith check except the jth bit. The jth variable
node shares an edge with the ith check node in GC if and only if j ∈ Ni.
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Example 3. The Tanner graph for a simple example is shown in Figure 25. This
graph corresponds to the following parity check matrix.
H =

1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
 (98)
Note that u1 has neighbors v1, v3, v5, and v7, which corresponds to the locations of
ones in the first row of H(n
′−k)×n′ . The relationship holds for the second and third


















Figure 25: Tanner graph for MP decoding over the BEC with a highlighted stopping
set caused by erasures at variable nodes v2, v4, and v6.
We will briefly mention here the existence of two general types of LDPC codes:
regular, and irregular.
Definition 12. A regular LDPC code is a code in which the number of ones in each
row of H is constant and equal for all rows. Similarly, the number of ones in each
column is equal for all columns.
Definition 13. An irregular LDPC code is any LDPC code that is not regular.
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To enhance these definitions, we present the idea of the degree distribution pair
from the edge perspective, (λ(x), ρ(x)). Let λi equal the fraction of edges in the
Tanner graph representation of a code that emanate from a variable node of degree
i, where the degree of a node is simply the number of edges that connect to it—or
are incident to it. The maximum degree of all variable nodes in the graph is dv.
Similarly, let ρi equal the fraction of edges the graph that emanate from check nodes
with degree i, and call the maximum degree of all check nodes dc. Then we can write













One can also write the degree distribution from the node perspective where coefficients
in the polynomials simply represent the fraction of nodes of a certain degree. The
interested reader is referred to [12] for more information.
Decoding of an LDPC codeword over a binary erasure channel (BEC) can be
accomplished using maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding [59], by solving a system of
equations. However, the iterative message-passing (MP) decoder is commonly used
because of its computational efficiency. We briefly explain both decoders, after fully
defining the BEC.
5.3.2 Maximum-Likelihood Decoding over the Binary Erasure Channel
Let us consider an LDPC codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn′) ∈ C transmitted over a binary
erasure channel (BEC) and let y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn′) denote the received codeword.
Then ci ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1, e} where e signifies an erased bit. Figure 26 gives
the graphical representation of the BEC model, where bits are erased at random with









Figure 26: Binary erasure channel model.
Define K = {i : yi 6= e} and K̄ = {i : yi = e}. Furthermore, HK and HK̄ can be
understood to be matrices formed by the columns of H(n
′−k)×n′ indexed by K and K̄,
respectively. Similarly, cK and cK̄ are vectors composed of only the bits indexed by






K̄ = 0, (101)





is known. The ML decoder must then solve for the channel-erased bits cK̄ using the





This system has a unique solution when the erased bits are such that the columns of
HK̄ are linearly independent [60]. We can obtain a bound from this statement that
we will use to analyze security in the worst-case.
Proposition 1. For a linear code C with blocklength n′ and dimension k, the ML
decoder over the BEC cannot have a unique solution if the number of erasures exceeds
(n′ − k), that is if |K̄| > n′ − k.
Proof. The rank of HK̄ equals the number of linearly independent rows or columns of
the matrix ([61], pg. 244), and cannot exceed the height of HK̄, which is n
′ − k.
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In fact, when the number of erasures exceeds (n′− k), the system in (103) will be
such that the degrees of freedom in the ML decoder
DML ≥ |K̄| − (n′ − k), (104)
where we achieve equality if the rank of HK̄ equals (n
′ − k) [59]. In any case,
DML = max{|K̄| − rank(HK̄), 0}. (105)
This definition clearly satisfies the notion of degrees of freedom from Definition 11 for
this decoder. Thus we see, that the effectiveness of the decoder is strictly bounded by
the redundancy of the code. While faster methods have been discovered for solving a
linear system of equations, the straightforward decoder is known to have complexity
((1−R)β+γδ)δ2(n′)3, where R is the rate of the code, β and γ are constants that are
also a function of the elimination algorithm chosen to solve the system of equations,
δ is the erasure probability in the channel, and n′ is the blocklength of the code [59].
5.3.3 Message-Passing Decoding
The MP decoder is an iterative decoder that can be understood easily using the Tan-
ner graph representation of C. The decoding process passes messages between U and
V along the edges of GC. One version of the decoder is given as Algorithm 1 (adapted
from [60]). The number of degrees of freedom in the MP decoder DMP is the cardi-
nality of the smallest set of bit values that must be supplied to decode all remaining
bits. If the decoder succeeds, then DMP = 0. Clearly, this maintains the definition
of degrees of freedom given in Definition 11 when restricted to this decoder, because
any bit combination of these DMP values decodes to a valid codeword, and each is
equally likely without further information. A bound on the correction capabilities of
the MP decoder is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The MP decoder over the BEC can correct no more than (n′ − k)
erasures.
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Proof. In Algorithm 1, each check node can correct at most one variable node, and
|U | = n′ − k.
The MP decoder is suboptimal compared with the ML decoder, although the MP
decoder has linear complexity in the blocklength [12]. A more detailed comparison of
the two decoders is offered in [62].
Algorithm 1 MP Decoder over the BEC [60].
1: Initialize: For yi 6= e, set vi = yi and A = {vi : yi 6= e}.
2: if (A = ∅ and no check node has degree one) then
3: Output the (possibly partial) codeword and stop.
4: else
5: Delete all vi ∈ A and their adjacent edges.
6: end if
7: For each vj connected to a degree one check node ui, set vj =
∑
k∈Ni,j vk, and
assign vj to A. Jump to 2.
5.3.4 Stopping Sets
To make D as large as possible for our system when an eavesdropper uses an MP
decoder, we would like to design the encoder block from Figure 24 so that every bit
erased by the channel adds a degree of freedom to the decoder. Stopping sets provide
a means of accomplishing this task.
Definition 14 (Di, et. al. [63]). A stopping set is a set S ⊆ V such that all check
nodes in N(S) are connected to S by at least two edges, where N(S) signifies the
neighborhood of S and is defined as the set of all adjacent nodes to any member of S
in GC.
The empty set, by definition, is a stopping set, as is any union of stopping sets.
Thus, any set of variable nodes has a unique maximal stopping set in it.1 See Figure
1We will sometimes ignore the empty set as a stopping set and say that a set A contains no
stopping sets, meaning that the maximal stopping set in A is ∅.
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25 for a simple example; clearly the erasures cannot be resolved using Algorithm 1.
This gives way to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Di et. al. [63], Lemma 1.1). Let GC be the Tanner graph defined by the
parity check matrix H of a binary linear block code C, and assume that C is used to
transmit over the BEC. Let A be the set of erased bits in the received codeword. Then,
using Algorithm 1 on GC, the set of erasures that remain after decoding comprise the
unique maximal stopping set in A.
Since stopping sets cause the MP decoder to fail, puncturing in the encoder is done
with the intent to inflict Eve with stopping sets. However, the ML decoder will still
succeed, even in the presence of stopping sets, as long as the erased bits have linearly
independent columns in H. We account for both decoders in our design by using
a particular ensemble of LDPC codes where DMP can be made equal to DML, thus
ensuring secrecy even if Eve chooses to use an ML decoder. This issue is addressed
in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. The simplicity of MP decoding is also preserved for all
legitimate receivers.2
5.4 Encoder
The encoder design is based on the fact that I(E; Z) ≤ I(E; X) because processing
cannot increase information, and E → X → Z is a Markov process [13]. The key
idea in the decoder is to reduce the bits in X to the decoding threshold. In other
words, X can be used to recover E by design, but any erased bit over Qw makes
unique decodability impossible. Proper design maximizes D for Eve. The stages
of encoding are portrayed in Figure 27, where each stage fulfills a specific purpose
within the overall goals of obtaining secrecy and reliability. The following principles
are addressed in the design of this encoder.
2For further information on stopping sets as they relate to LDPC code ensembles, see [64] and
[65].
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• Bits of E are hidden from immediate access in the decoded codewords using
nonsystematic LDPC codes.
• Scrambling prior to coding magnifies errors in the decoder.
• The error-correction capabilities of the LDPC code are restricted by intentional
puncturing of encoded bits. (Bob obtains reliability through ARQ, rather than
error correction.)
• Bits from encoded blocks are interleaved throughout all packets so that an


















Figure 27: Detailed block diagram of the encoder. Number and size of blocks or
packets are indicated at each step.
5.4.1 Nonsystematic LDPC Codes
Recall from Section 5.2 that
E = EkL = (Ek1,E
k




Eki = (E(i−1)k+1, E(i−1)k+2, . . . , Eik) (107)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , L. These L blocks of encrypted message form the input to the
nonsystematic LDPC encoder with blocklength n′ and dimension k. The output of













i = (B(i−1)n′+1, B(i−1)n′+2, . . . , Bin′). (109)
Certainly, if the code C is systematic, then the bits of Eki appear explicitly in the
codeword Bn
′
i . Therefore, we choose C to be nonsystematic, so the input bits do not
appear explicitly in the output bits.
Nonsystematic LDPC coding is typically implemented as a two stage process to
improve encoder complexity [66, 67, 31]. Let Sk×k be an invertible scrambling matrix
over GF (2), and let G be a k × n′ systematic generator matrix. The ith block of E,








where A = (Ak1,A
k
2, . . . ,A
k
L) is the collection of scrambled data blocks. The data are







for i = 1, 2, . . . , L to obtain B.
Clearly, the inverse operation at the decoder first requires the bits of B to be
obtained through either MP or ML decoding. Since G is systematic, the bits of A
are explicit in B. The bits of E can then be found by applying the inverse of Sk×k a





This process amplifies errors in the decoding process as a function of the sparsity
of S−1. We find S−1 using the LU decomposition [61] over GF (2). By simulation
results, we know that nonsingular randomly generated scrambling matrices have in-
verses with just less than 50% of the entries equal to one on average. Thus, the
resulting descrambling operation in (112) is enough to cause even a single error in Aki
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to propagate into a bit-error rate (BER) of 0.5 in Eki (see Section 5.8). This result is
intuitive because a bit in Eki is a linear combination of bits in A
k
i . Say that a single
bit Ej is the GF (2) sum of several bits in A, due to the descrambling operation, so
that
Ej = Al1 ⊕ Al2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Alξ . (113)
Then, Ej is in error if an odd number of bits in the set {Al1 , Al2 , . . . , Alξ} are in error.
On average, the row weights in S−1 are approximately k/2, and the expectation of
k/2 bits in error holds for any number of errors in Aki .
Since only one (S,S−1) pair is needed, the matrices can be generated offline. The
complexity of both the encoder and decoder is increased by the matrix multiplications
in (110) and (112), respectively. Both of these operations are O(k3). General system-
atic encoder complexity is O((n′)2) because G is not sparse by design [12], although
improvements can be made using appropriate preprocessing as outlined in [60]. The
encoding technique specified in [60] gives encoder complexity of O(n′ + g2) where g
is the gap in an approximate lower triangular form of the parity check matrix and is
less than n′− k. The complexities for the ML and MP decoders are given in Sections
5.3.2 and 5.3.3 as O((n′)3) and O(n′), respectively.
5.4.2 Puncturing
The next step is to puncture bits from each codeword in B. Let the puncturing
pattern R ∈ V be the set of bits to be punctured in each Bn′i . Recall that V is the
set of variable nodes in the Tanner graph GC. The punctured blocks
P = PnL = (Pn1 ,P
n




Pni = (P(i−1)n+1, P(i−1)n+2, . . . , Pin), (115)
are shown in Figure 27 to have length n, which was defined in Section 5.2 to be the
effective blocklength of the entire encoder. All unpunctured bits belong to the set Q
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so that V = R+Q; therefore, the length of each block in P is equal to |Q| = n. The
puncturing pattern R is chosen to induce stopping sets in an eavesdropper’s received
data.
Definition 15. A puncturing pattern R is acceptable if and only if there are no
stopping sets in R, and R + v contains some nonempty stopping set Sv for every
v ∈ Q.
Such a set R can be constructed using the random technique outlined in Algo-
rithm 2, which also calls Algorithm 3 to check for stopping sets in a computationally
tractable manner [9]. For Algorithm 3 to make sense, we must define the notion of
an induced subgraph.
Definition 16. Let G be a graph with a set of vertices V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn′} and a
set of edges E. Denote the edge between vertices vi and vj as vivj. Furthermore,
consider a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V . Then the graph that has V ′ as its vertex set,
and exactly those edges xy ∈ E such that x, y ∈ V ′ as its edge set, is an induced
subgraph of G. We say that V ′ induces such a graph on G and write
G′ =: G[V ′] (116)
to indicate the induced subgraph G′ [68].
Algorithm 2 Finds an acceptable puncturing pattern R ⊆ V .
1: Initialize: R = v, for some v ∈ V , Q = ∅.
2: while (V \(R ∪Q) 6= ∅) do
3: Check for stopping sets in R+v for another randomly chosen v ∈ V \(R∪Q).
4: if (R + v has a stopping set) then
5: Q = Q+ v.
6: else




Algorithm 3 Checks for nonempty stopping sets in A ⊆ V [9].
1: Initialize: S = A
2: while (S 6= ∅) do
3: Induce the subgraph G′ = G[S ∪N(S))].
4: if (∃ a check node in G′ with degree 1) then
5: Delete variable nodes in S that are adjacent to check nodes of degree 1
in G′.
6: else
7: Return true. S is the maximal nonempty stopping set in A.
8: end if
9: end while
10: Return false. There is no nonempty stopping set in A.
Lemma 5. The output of Algorithm 2 is always an acceptable puncturing pattern R
as defined in Definition 15.
Proof. We must first show that upon completion of Algorithm 2, there are no stopping
sets in R. Assume for a contradiction that R has a stopping set. Then there is a bit
v ∈ R that when added to R during the construction process, caused a stopping set
to first appear. Then by Algorithm 2, v /∈ R. This provides the contradiction. It
remains to be proved that Algorithm 3 operates as expected.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 3 always returns true when A has a nonempty stopping
set, and always returns false otherwise.
Proof of Proposition. Suppose that the bits in A are erasures over the BEC, and
Algorithm 1 is used to decode. Realize that erasures recovered in the ith iteration of
Algorithm 1 correspond exactly to the nodes deleted in the ith iteration of Algorithm
3. If all bits can be resolved using MP decoding then all nodes will be deleted
in Algorithm 3, and false is returned. If, however, MP decoding returns a partial
codeword, then Algorithm 3 will return true because all remaining bits have degree
greater than one in the induced subgraph G′. By Lemma 4, the remaining nodes
comprise the maximal stopping set of A.
To complete the proof of Lemma 5, we must also show that for any v ∈ Q, R+ v
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has a nonempty stopping set. Since in Algorithm 2 every v ∈ Q is such that for some
subset R′ ⊆ R, R′ + v has a stopping set, therefore R + v has a stopping set for any
v ∈ Q.
Thus, puncturing according to R in each Bn
′
i for i = 1, 2, . . . , L, guarantees that
every bit in each Pni is crucial for successful MP decoding.
Complexity of Algorithm 2 is linear in the blocklength n′, because it chooses (n′−1)
bits in a random order, and calls Algorithm 3 after each choice. The complexity of
Algorithm 3 in the worst case, is quadratic in |U | = (n′−k), the number of check nodes






if a single node is deleted each time the line is executed. Therefore, the complexity of
finding R is at most quadratic in |U |, and linear in n′, i.e. has complexity O(n′|U |2).
As a result, the algorithm can be used in practical system design to compute R offline.
5.4.3 Regular versus Irregular Codes
The overall rate k/n of the nonsystematic and punctured code is a function of the
rate of the systematic LDPC code, and |R|. Simulations have shown that the size
of R is a function of the degree distribution on C, although the exact relationship is
still unknown.
Example 4. Let C be a regular rate-1/2 code with n′ = 1000, wc = 4, and wr = 8,
where wc and wr are the fixed column and row weights of the parity check matrix,
respectively. The size of |R| appears to be Gaussian-distributed for this family of
codes with a mean size of approximately 436, with variance roughly equal to 15.
Let us examine, however, an irregular ensemble with the same rate and blocklength,
but having the following degree distribution pair from the edge perspective: λ(x) =
0.32660x+ 0.11960x2 + 0.18393x3 + 0.36988x4 on variable node weights, and ρ(x) =
0.78555x5 + 0.21445x6 on check node weights (see (99) and (100), as well as [12] pg.
664), where H is formed using the socket approach given in [59]. Here the distribution
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on |R| is much tighter, ranging from 496 to 500. The cardinality of R is equal to 500
with probability approximately 0.1, 499 with probability roughly 0.56, and 498 with
probability near 0.26. Thus, codes exist for which Algorithm 2 returns R such that
|R| = n′ − k with reasonable probability.
As a direct result, a puncturing pattern generated for the irregular code in Exam-
ple 4 has a unique property. That is, for some patterns, DMP = DML.
Lemma 6. Let Rc denote the indices of the channel-erased bits of P
n
i , and DMP and
DML denote the degrees of freedom using MP decoding and ML decoding, respectively.
If an irregular LDPC code is employed over the BEC with intentional puncturing such
that |R| = n′ − k, then DML = DMP = |Rc|.
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 2, the respective ML and MP decoders can correct
a maximum of n′ − k erasures. Since |R| = n′ − k, any erasure by the channel is
guaranteed to give a degree of freedom in either decoder.
It should be noted that if the sum of systematic bits in R + Rc is less than D, a
brute-force attack on these bits might be more appealing to an attacker than decoding
the entire codeword. To cover this possibility, D should be defined as the minimum
between the number of systematic bits missing to the eavesdropper, and the degrees of
freedom in the decoder. Although, in practice the number of systematic bits removed
through puncturing or erased by the channel exceeds the degrees of freedom in the
decoder with high probability.
5.4.4 Interleaving
The role of the interleaver is to ensure that all packets must be obtained error free
for successful decoding in any and all encoded blocks. To do this, we construct a
collection of η packets to be transmitted X = (XαL1 ,X
αL
2 , . . . ,X
αL
η ) in the following
manner. Alice picks α to be a small positive integer that is assumed to divide n for
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ease in notation. Then, η = n
α
and the ith packet is formed as
XαLi =(P(i−1)α+1, . . . , Piα, P(i−1)α+n+1, . . . , Piα+n, . . . ,
P(i−1)α+(n−1)n+1, . . . , Piα+(n−1)n) (117)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , η. Although this expression is accurate, it is admittedly cumbersome.
In words, we form the packet Xi by concatenating α bits from each encoded and
punctured block Pj for j = 1, 2, . . . , L. Therefore, a single erased packet causes α
channel erasures in each punctured block at the decoder. Since we have designed R so
that any erasure results in a stopping set, we can be assured that any erased packet
will cause all L blocks to fail in the MP decoder. If |R| = n′−k, then the same result
holds for ML decoding by Lemma 6.
Corollary 1. If |R| = n′ − k and packets are formed according to (117), then the
number of degrees of freedom in the ith codeword is DiML = D
i
MP = |Ric| = α|Rp| for
i = 1, 2, . . . , L, where Rp is a list of all erased packets and R
i
c are the channel-erased
bits in the ith codeword. Furthermore, DiML = D
j
MP∀i, j.
Proof. The first part is trivial and follows directly from Lemma 6 and (117). We see
that DiML = D
j
MP because a missing packet means exactly α degrees of freedom in
each block, irrespective of decoder choice.
5.5 Decoder for Legitimate Users
The decoder for legitimate users is simply the inverse of all encoder operations. A
user can decode all data as long as every packet is received error free. Legitimate
users make use of the authenticated feedback channel to request retransmission of
packets erased in the main channel during transmission.3 The decoding process is
depicted in Figure 28. Once all packets are obtained in Ỹ, the bits are deinterleaved
3Time delay and queueing aspects of ARQ protocols are well-addressed in the literature, e.g. [69]
and its references.
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back into their intentionally punctured codewords P̃. The MP decoder is guaranteed
to decode in linear time with the blocklength to obtain B̃ [12], and the inverse of the
scrambling matrix is applied to the systematic decoded bits using (112) to obtain Ẽ.


















Figure 28: Detailed block diagram of Bob’s decoder. Number and size of blocks or
packets are indicated at each step.
5.6 Security against Wiretappers
An eavesdropper can decode the data using Bob’s decoder in Figure 28 if all packets
are obtained error free. The independence of Qm and Qw, however, prevents Eve from
receiving packets as a function of δ and ε, the respective probabilities of erasures in
Qm and Qw. Let Ref be the event that a single packet is received error free by at least
one eavesdropper after all retransmissions of the packet requested by any legitimate
receiver have been filled. This section shows the blanket security effect of our encoder
over nearly the entire region of possible (δ, ε) pairs by characterizing the distribution
on D. General security results are shown as a function of Pr(Ref ), followed by
expressions for Pr(Ref ) for the wiretap channel case, the broadcast scenario with m
intended receivers, the case with l collaborating eavesdroppers, and the most general
case with both m legitimate receivers and l collaborating eavesdroppers. Legitimate
receivers are always given access to the feedback channel, and eavesdroppers are
always restricted to passive status, using authentication. Retransmissions in the
ARQ protocol are executed only after requests are received from all legitimate parties.
The results assume an encoder that satisfies Corollary 1; therefore, D represents the
degrees of freedom in every codeword using either the ML or MP decoder.
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5.6.1 General Security Theorems
Lemma 7. The random variable D that governs the number of degrees of freedom in
a received codeword is a scaled binomial random variable. Thus, for 1 ≤ β ≤ αη,







(1− Pr(Ref ))i Pr(Ref )η−i. (118)
Proof. By definition of Ref , packets are erased for eavesdroppers with probability (1−
Pr(Ref )). Since there are η independent Bernoulli trials, each identically distributed,
the sum of erased packets |Rp| is a binomial random variable with parameters η and
(1−Pr(Ref )) [70]. Then, by Corollary 1, D = α|Rp| where α bits from every codeword
are sorted into each packet. Thus, D is a scaled binomial random variable; specifically
D ∼ Bin(η, 1 − Pr(Ref ))α. Since D = α|Rp|, then D ≥ β implies that α|Rp| ≥ β.
Clearly, this requires that |Rp| ≥ dβ/αe. The result in (118) follows directly.
The expected value is, therefore, known because of the binomial structure of D.
We also prove an important property in regards to E[D] in the following theorem.






H(X|Z) = (1− Pr(Ref ))n = (1− Pr(Ref ))k. (119)
Proof. Since |R| = n′ − k, then n = |Q| = n′ − |R| = k. Therefore, k
n
= 1. Further-
more, we can assume η independent uses of a PEC with packets of length αL. Let
X = (XαL1 ,X
αL
2 , . . . ,X
αL




2 , . . . ,Z
αL
η )
be the output, where αL bits are erased with probability (1 − Pr(Ref )) or received
error free with probability Pr(Ref ) with each channel use. The input distribution
on αL bits in each packet is uniform because the input distribution on E is uni-
form, and the encoding function with rate k
n
= 1 forms a bijection on k bits. Thus,
H(Xi) = αL for i = 1, 2, . . . , η. It can be shown that H(Zi|Xi) = H(1−Pr(Ref ))αL,
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= α(1− Pr(Ref )). (120)
Therefore, with η independent uses of the channel (one for each packet),
1
L
H(X|Z) = (1− Pr(Ref ))ηα
= (1− Pr(Ref ))n. (121)







= (1− Pr(Ref ))η, (122)
which implies the equivalence stated in the theorem.
Thus we see that the expected number of degrees of freedom in each codeword,
E[D], is equal to the per-codeword equivocation when the puncturing is accomplished
so that |R| = n′ − k. Perfect secrecy is then obtained when E[D] = k, because
1
L
H(X) = k. Of course, this occurs when Pr(Ref ) = 0, which implies that the
eavesdropper obtains zero packets. Thus, this scheme cannot achieve perfect secrecy
in practice. However, it can be shown using the achievable rates in [21] that E[D]
approaches the maximum achievable equivocation when k
n
= 1.
The encoder design is such that an eavesdropper will likely need to resolve the
degrees of freedom through trial and error. The number of expected trials to guess








Now that the distribution on D is known, E[2D] can be calculated. Let us assume
that α = 1, and therefore, η = n for simplicity of notation. With α = 1, the pmf of
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D is





(1− Pr(Ref ))d Pr(Ref )n−d. (123)

















[2(1− Pr(Ref ))]d Pr(Ref )n−d
= (2− Pr(Ref ))n. (124)







an−ibi = (a+ b)n. (125)
Therefore, in a general sense, by applying (92) we can anticipate that an attacker
must make an average of
1
2
[(2− Pr(Ref ))n + 1] (126)
guesses to resolve D degrees of freedom in a single codeword (L = 1).
5.6.2 Bounds on Security Enhancement for General Ciphers
We now generate bounds on attack complexity against general ciphers when a trans-
mission includes multiple codewords (L ≥ 1), and D = d degrees of freedom are
present in an attacker’s received codewords. Since an attack against the underlying
cryptography could feasibly be staged using a single block of Ê, especially with large
blocklengths, we only guarantee failure of the attack if every block in Ê has an ex-
pected error rate of 0.5. Using similar logic, it can be said that if an attack would
succeed using the error-free ciphertext E, then it may fail even if a single block in Ê
has an error rate of 0.5. Note that D is fixed in this analysis, but an approximation of
the security for random D can be obtained by taking the expectation of the bounds.
Before we present the bounds, we must take an aside to calculate the expectation
of the minimum of L uniform discrete random variables.
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Lemma 8. Let U1, U2, . . . , UL be uniform discrete random variables over the alphabet
U = {1, 2, . . . , nu}. Then




























i− k + 1
. (128)















where B1 = +
1
2
. For proof of the first equality, let Y = min(U1, U2, . . . , UL), and let
us note the expression






and use it to calculate the pmf of Y
pY (y) = Pr(Y = y) = Pr(Y > y − 1)− Pr(Y > y)
=
(










































This completes the proof.
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The expectation of the maximum of L uniform discrete random variables can be
calculated in a similar fashion.
Lemma 9. Let U1, U2, . . . , UL be uniform discrete random variables over the alphabet
U = {1, 2, . . . , nu}. Then
E[max(U1, U2, . . . , UL)] = nu + 1− E[min(U1, U2, . . . , UL)]. (133)
Proof. Let Z = max(U1, U2, . . . , UL), and let us write down the cdf of Z






Now, calculate the pmf of Z as before













































= nu − E[min(U1, U2, . . . , UL)] + 1. (136)
With these pieces in place, we state the following theorem giving bounds of secrecy
for our encoder over attacking eavesdroppers for fixed D.
Theorem 6. Define the complexity of a cryptographic attack to be CA. Let D = d be
the degrees of freedom of each of L blocks in B̂. If an attacker must recover at least
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one block of error-free ciphertext to stage a successful attack against the cryptography,
then the expected complexity CPL of a successful attack on the system is bounded as
fC(2
d, L)CA ≤ CPL ≤
[















and Bi is the ith Bernoulli number as in Lemma 8.
Proof. By Corollary 1 each codeword in B̂ has the same number of degrees of freedom.
Thus, d bits must be guessed in each of L punctured codewords in P̂. Furthermore,
the correctness of a guess must be verified by executing an attack on the underlying
cryptography. In this analysis we assume the attack succeeds if the ciphertext is
error free, and fails if the ciphertext has BER 0.5. Assume that an attacker can
guess bit patterns on all codewords in P̂ simultaneously. The correct bit patterns
of the channel-erased bits in the L codewords P̂ are uniformly distributed over 2d
possibilities in each block. The lower bound is formulated by multiplying the attack
complexity by the expected number of guesses until at least one of L codewords
is found. Thus the lower bound is the product of CA and the expectation on the
minimum of L uniform discrete random variables that are drawn from the alphabet
U = {1, 2, . . . , 2d}. Application of the result from Lemma 8 given in (127) completes
the proof of the lower bound.
The upper bound is calculated similarly, but we assume that all patterns must
be guessed to guarantee success; therefore, the bound is given by the product of CA
and the expectation of the maximum of L uniform discrete random variables from
Lemma 9 given in (133).
More than likely, a successful attack against the cryptography will require at least
a certain number of consecutive blocks of error-free ciphertext to execute successfully
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[48]. Clearly a 0.5 BER in any block would destroy an attack with these requirements.
Therefore, the upper bound in (137) serves as a good approximation to the expected
amount of work necessary to complete the attack, with L being set by the amount of
ciphertext required for the attack. Thus we see, that our system appends a multiplier
that is exponential in d to the complexity of a cryptographic attack by exploiting
channel characteristics at the physical-layer.
5.6.3 One Receiver and One Wiretapper
Although the general security solutions are proved in Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, we still
require expressions for Pr(Ref ) under a variety of scenarios to complete the security
characterization in D. The simplest case matches the setup given in Figure 24, and
was originally proved in [9].
Lemma 10. For the packet erasure wiretap channel with feedback for authenticated





Proof. Let W be the total number of times that Bob requests a single packet over
Qm before he obtains it error free. Recall that it is erased each time independently
with probability δ. Therefore, W is a random variable that takes on the number of
total transmissions up to and including the first successful reception of the packet,
and is thus geometrically distributed with success parameter (1− δ) [70]. Then,
Pr (W = w) = (1− δ)δw−1. (140)
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Recall that the probability of an erased packet in Qw is ε. Therefore,
Pr (Ref ) =
∞∑
w=1















Intuition of security for the wiretap channel in terms of D can be gained by using
the expression for Pr(Ref ) in (139) to plot Pr(D ≥ β) in (118) for different values of
β, α, and η. Figure 29 shows Pr(D ≥ 1) for η = 100. Note that when β = 1, α is not
required to evaluate (118). This case is provided to emphasize the plateau and falloff
regions in the (δ, ε) grid for Pr(D ≥ β). Throughout the plateau region, stopping sets
occur in the MP decoder and the ML decoder has linearly dependent columns in HK̄
with probability very close to one. The results of Lemmas 7 and 10 give






This expression can be examined in the limit as η →∞. It is immediate that except
for when δ = 1 or ε = 0, Pr(D ≥ 1) goes to one for all (δ, ε) pairs as η gets large. From




. Clearly η grows with k, n and n′. LDPC
codes with blocklength n′ = 10, 000 are deemed practical by today’s standards. For
α = 1 and for a carefully chosen R with size roughly 5000, then η ≈ 5000. This case is
shown in Figure 30, where as expected, all nontrivial (δ, ε) pairs have Pr(D ≥ 1) ≈ 1.
But of course, a single degree of freedom is easily guessed in an attack. Let us
examine the effects on security with larger β. This perspective is provided in Figure
31, where η = 5000 and β = 50 with α = 1. As can be seen in the figure, there



















Figure 29: Pr(D ≥ 1) when the number of packets η = 100, as a function of the
respective erasure probabilities in Qm and Qw, δ and ε.
β degrees of freedom with probability very close to one, while pairs outside the region
have D < β with probability close to one. Owing to the severity of the cutoff, the
threshold can be approximated by setting Pr(D ≥ β) = 0.5 in (118), and deriving a
function of δ and ε. This technique provides a unique threshold for each unique triple
(β, α, η).








This function grows linearly with n, which is equal to k when |R| = n′ − k. Thus, to
driveD to a large number in practice, we simply increase the dimension of the encoder.
Note that in the expectation the choice of α does not affect security; although, α =
1 allows η to be as large as possible, thus providing more confidence that single
realizations of D are close to E[D] by the law of large numbers ([70], pg. 193).
5.6.4 Multiple Intended Receivers
In this section, we move past the single user case, and address the more general broad-



















Figure 30: Pr(D ≥ 1) when the number of packets η = 5000, as a function of the
respective erasure probabilities in Qm and Qw, δ and ε.
probability of an erased packet ε, as before. This case allows us to understand the
repercussions on security of having more than one user for whom we allow feedback
requests. Security is still characterized by Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 in the m user
case, but Pr(Ref ) must be found. Recall that Ref is the event that Eve receives a
single transmitted packet. Let each user have an independent PEC with probability
of erasure in the ith user’s channel as δi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. The following lemma is
necessary to obtain Pr(Ref ).
Lemma 11. If Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm are independent geometrically distributed random vari-
ables with success parameters λ1, λ2, . . . , λm, and Tm = max(Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm), then the







(1− (1− λi)t−1). (143)
Proof. The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity, but follows from induction on
m.



















Figure 31: Pr(D ≥ 50) when α = 1 and η = 5000, as a function of the respective
erasure probabilities in Qm and Qw, δ and ε.
































where the notation i < j means the summation traverses over all pairs (i, j) such that
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and i < j, and similarly for i < j < k, etc.
Proof. Note that if the ith user requests a single packet until it is received, and in
each transmission it is received with probability δi, then the total number of times the
user must request the packet is governed by a geometric random variable with success
parameter 1− δi [70]. Define W1,W2, . . . ,Wm as the geometric random variables gov-
erning the total number of transmissions necessary for users 1, 2, . . . ,m, respectively,
to obtain the packet error free. Then, let W = max(W1,W2, . . . ,Wm). W governs
the total number of transmissions necessary for all legitimate parties to receive the
packet.
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By Lemma 11, we know that






(1− δw−1i ). (145)
Finally, we point out that
m∏
i=1



























































































































































In this section we consider the case with l eavesdroppers working together to ob-
tain the cryptogram E, each with a possibly unique probability of packet erasure
ε1, ε2, . . . , εl. All are assumed to obtain packets through independent PECs. It is
simpler to first consider a single legitimate user Bob with probability of packet era-
sure δ. Then the general result that assumes m friendly parties with l collaborating
eavesdroppers comes easily.









Proof. The proof is straightforward if we note that collaborating eavesdroppers receive
a single sent packet if at least one of them obtains the packet error free. Let W be
a geometric random variable with success parameter 1− δ. This governs the number





















This answer provides an easy bridge to an extremely general result.
Corollary 2. For m intended parties and l eavesdroppers with similar notation as
before,






















Proof. This proof follows directly from the techniques used in the proofs of Lemmas
12 and 13.
5.7 Correlated Erasures in Qm and Qw
Although the independence assumption on erasures occurring over Qm and Qw is
fair in many cases; physical deployment of the receiver antennas, the availability of
line-of-sight, and the presence or absence of scatterers at the transmitter and re-
ceivers [73, 74] may result in parallel channels between a transmitter and multiple
receivers having correlated erasures. Therefore, we also address the effects of corre-
lation between packet erasures at the intended receiver and packet erasures at the
eavesdropper. The security analysis for this case necessitates a clear understanding
of bounds on the correlation coefficient. This allows analysis of security enhancement
assuming best and worst correlation conditions. In many cases security enhancement
can still be obtained, even when the eavesdropper has a better channel than the le-
gitimate receiver and erasures are correlated. In fact, correlation cannot reduce E[D]
to zero if the legitimate receiver’s channel quality is strictly better than that of the
eavesdropper.
5.7.1 Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Since we still assume Qm and Qw to be memoryless, erasures occur independently
with respect to other erasures in the same channel; however, erasures of the same
packet but across different channels are correlated with correlation coefficient ρ. Let
Em and Ew be Bernoulli random variables that take on values in the set {0, 1},
where one signifies erasure and zero signifies error-free reception of a packet. Then,
Pr(Em = 1) = δ and Pr(Ew = 1) = ε. The covariance of two random variables A and
B is defined as [70]
cov(A,B) = E[(A− E[A])(B − E[B])], (152)
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and the variance of a random variable A can be expressed as
var(A) = cov(A,A). (153)
Given these definitions, the Pearson correlation coefficient between random variables
Em and Ew is [70]
ρ =
cov (Em, Ew)√








The last step is made using the first and second moments of a Bernoulli random
variable, where E[Em] = E[E2m] = δ and E[Ew] = E[E2w] = ε. Let pij = Pr(Em =
i, Ew = j) [75]. Then, δ = p10 + p11 = E[Em] and ε = p01 + p11 = E[Ew]. It is trivial






The Pearson correlation coefficient is commonly used to indicate the degree to
which two random variables are similar. Although |ρ| ≤ 1, it is a common miscon-
ception that ρ can take on any value from −1 to +1. In reality, there are bounds to
the coefficient that are a function of the distribution of the random variables involved
[76]. In our case, we have allowed δ and ε to take on any value in [0, 1]. We also know
that δ = p11 + p10, ε = p11 + p01, and p00 + p01 + p10 + p11 = 1. Since pij ≥ 0 for
i, j ∈ {0, 1}, then
max(δ + ε− 1, 0) ≤ p11 ≤ min(δ, ε). (156)
The bounds on p11 can be translated to bounds on ρ as
max(δ + ε− 1, 0)− δε√
δε(1− δ)(1− ε)
≤ ρ ≤ min(δ, ε)− δε√
δε(1− δ)(1− ε)
. (157)
For example, if δ = 0.3 and ε = 0.15, then −0.275 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.642.
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5.7.2 Security Results for Correlated Erasures
In presenting results for the correlated case, we again assume that the degree dis-
tribution for the LDPC code and the puncturing pattern R are chosen such that
|R| = n′ − k. Thus, the MP decoder achieves the ML performance, and furthermore,
D is equivalent in each decoded codeword.
The general results of Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 still hold for the correlated erasure
case, because although erasures in Qm and Qw are correlated, each packet is received
error free by Eve independent from other packets. Therefore, the reception of each
transmitted packet can still be considered a Bernoulli experiment. The sum of the
missing packets remains binomial with success parameter 1− Pr(Ref ). Therefore, as
with the previous generalizations of the security analysis, we only need to calculate
Pr(Ref ) under the new assumption, i.e., when erasure events over Qm and Qw are
correlated.
Lemma 14. In the packet erasure wiretap channel scenario with feedback for ARQ,
and where Lemma 7 and Theorem 5 are satisfied, if channel erasures are correlated
events across Qm and Qw with correlation coefficient ρ, then
Pr(Ref ) =
1− ε




Proof. Let W be the total number of times that Bob requests a single packet over Qm
before he obtains it error free. Since Qm is memoryless, the packet is erased each time
independently with probability δ. Therefore, W is a random variable that takes on
the number of total transmissions up to and including the first successful reception of
the packet, and is thus geometrically distributed with success parameter 1− δ. Then,
[70]
Pr (W = j) = (1− δ)δj−1. (159)
Let Eim and E
i
w denote the respective erasure outcomes in Qm and Qw for the ith
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retransmission of the packet, where a one signifies an erased packet as before. There-
fore,
Pr (Ref ) =
∞∑
j=1






























1− p11 − p01
1− p11
. (160)
Now we calculate p11 = ρ
√










Clearly, this reduces to the independent case in (139) when ρ = 0. Figures 32 and
33 give examples of Pr(D ≥ β) using this expression for Pr(Ref ) where β is chosen
to be one and 50, respectively. Both figures assume rate-1/2 LDPC codes in the
encoder, and maximum-sized puncturing sets R. Figure 32 shows the result when the
blocklength n′ = 200, |R| = 100, and the packing factor α = 1. Figure 33 assumes
n′ = 10, 000, |R| = n′ − k = 5000, and α = 1. Therefore, η = n
α
= 100 for the first
case, and η = n/α = 5000 for the second case. We set δ = 0.5 and plot different ε
values as ρ takes on all possible values indicated by the bounds in (157). Both figures
imply the existence of a correlation threshold ρth for Pr(D ≥ β), in that if all other
parameters are set, then for ρ < ρth, Pr(D ≥ β) is essentially one, and for ρ > ρth,
Pr(D ≥ β) is essentially zero. The differences in the two figures show the result on
104
security caused by increasing n′, and thus increasing η. The main difference is the
sharpness of the falloff in the curves, indicating that the threshold is better defined
for larger η. Furthermore—and trivially—more degrees of freedom can be obtained
with larger blocklength, even for higher correlation factors simply because there are
more packets that could be lost to the eavesdropper. For instance, notice in Figure
33 that when ε = 0.51, Pr(D ≥ 50) ≈ 1∀ρ. There is no equivalent effect in Figure 32
for smaller blocklength.

























Figure 32: Pr(D ≥ 1) when the number of packets η = 100, α = 1, and Bob’s erasure
probability δ = 0.5. Results are plotted for varying erasure probabilities ε for Eve’s
channel as a function of the correlation coefficient ρ.
Now that we understand how correlation affects D, we evaluate the extreme cases
in correlation coefficients by considering the bounds on ρ in (157).
Consider the lower bound
ρ =






1−max(δ + ε− 1, 0)
. (162)
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Figure 33: Pr(D ≥ 50) when the number of packets η = 5000, α = 1, and Bob’s
erasure probability δ = 0.5. Results are plotted for varying erasure probabilities ε for





2−δ−ε if δ + ε > 1
1− ε otherwise
(163)
If δ+ε > 1, this implies that Pr(Ref ) > 1−ε. When δ+ε ≤ 1, Pr(Ref ) = 1−ε implies
that negative correlation can reduce the eavesdropper to an effective erasure channel
where only one chance is given to intercept each packet, despite retransmission of
some packets. Of course, the reasoning behind this is that this minimum correlation
indicates that all of Eve’s missing packets are obtained by Bob in the first transmission
with probability one.










thus implying that when Eve has at least as good of a channel as Bob, i.e. δ ≥ ε, that
the upper bound yields perfect correlation, and every packet is eventually received
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by Eve error free. However, if Bob can maintain a channel advantage over Eve such





Thus, even maximum correlation cannot reduce E[D] to zero. Since E[D] grows with
k in (119), this indicates that we can still gain as many degrees of freedom as we
desire on average by increasing the dimension of the encoder.
5.8 Ciphertext Error Rates
In Section 5.4.1, we argued that the descrambling operation will provide an expected
error rate of 0.5 in the ciphertext output when an incorrect guess is made on the bits
associated with the degrees of freedom. Here we provide additional discussion and
simulation results that verify this argument. Let us explicitly define
P̂nL = (P̂n1 , P̂
n
2 , . . . , P̂
n
L) (167)






2 , . . . , B̂
n′
L ) (168)
be the decoded codewords. Finally, define the block structure of Eve’s decoder output
as
ÊkL = (Êk1, Ê
k
2, . . . , Ê
k
L). (169)
Each channel-erased bit in the block P̂i yields a degree of freedom in B̂i, and complete
recovery of B̂i requires that D bits in P̂i be guessed correctly. If a guess is incorrect,
then the decoding operation will still provide a valid codeword, and therefore, there
will be at least as many errors in B̂i as the minimum distance of the LDPC code, i.e.,
the minimum Hamming distance between codewords. The descrambling process in
(112) magnifies any errors in B̂i to an expected BER of 0.5 in Êi. Corollary 1 from
Section 5.4.4 shows that for our encoder, it is possible to ensure the same for each
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block in Ê. Therefore, a brute-force attack on D bits must be accomplished to obtain
each Êi.
Simulations of the end-to-end encoder and decoder were performed using the ir-
regular LDPC code of Example 4 from Section 5.4.3 with n′ = 1000, k = 500, and
L = 1. Puncturing patterns used were such that |R| ≥ 498 bits. Let γ be the number
of bits in Eve’s guess that are incorrect. Results are shown when γ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 200, 300, and 400 in Figure 34. Each γ
value was tested 300 times on both the MP and ML decoder, while a new puncturing
pattern R was generated every 10 experiments, and a new code from the ensemble
was selected every 30 experiments. All tests produced BERs in Ê between 0.414 and
0.578 with a mean of 0.5002. There is no noticeable difference between MP and ML

































Figure 34: The simulated error rates in Eve’s decoded cryptogram Ê when γ errors
are made in guessing bit values for D degrees of freedom in one of Eve’s received
codewords.
These results verify that unless D bits are guessed correctly for each codeword,
Eve would be forced to attack the cryptographic layer of this system with an average
BER of 0.5 in Ê. We can expect such an attack to fail miserably, as the indication is
that the ciphertext could have been made just as reliable by flipping a coin for the bit
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values. As an example, the stream cipher analysis in Chapter 4 required much smaller
error rates in the ciphertext to render both studied attacks completely ineffective.
5.9 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented and analyzed a practical physical-layer coding scheme
that provides cryptographic security enhancements using channel coding techniques
with ARQ. The design requirements are few because the system works for nearly
every combination of channel parameters in the packet erasure wiretap channel. The
security analysis reveals that this encoder provides degrees of freedom in an attacker’s
knowledge of the codewords. Since the attacker has no information about the bits
associated with the degrees of freedom, a brute-force attack on these bits must be
performed. The system propagates errors to an expected bit-error rate of 0.5 in the
ciphertext for all guesses that are not exactly correct, and thus, the end result of
the expected increase in attack complexity on the cryptosystem from our scheme is
a multiplier that is exponential in the number of degrees of freedom. The system
provides cryptographic security enhancement, even when eavesdroppers have an ad-
vantage over legitimate receivers in signal quality. The system was shown to still
provide security, although a lesser amount, when the number of legitimate receivers
or the number of collaborating attackers increases, or when erasures across the main
channel and the wiretap channel are correlated.
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CHAPTER VI
COMBINING PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY WITH
CRYPTOGRAPHY
The results from both the channel coding design problem, and the cryptanalysis
of error-prone ciphertext problem combine to make a compelling argument in favor
of multilayer security. For one, a largely untapped source of security—the physical
layer—is exploited to strengthen cryptography; and for two, in the absence of security
from the physical layer, the cryptographic layer can still stand alone with no penalty
on secrecy. If cryptography is the only source of security in a system, then channel
codes will provide reliable ciphertext for friendly parties and eavesdroppers alike;
thus, squandering the possible increase in security attainable from the physical layer.
On the other hand, if physical-layer secrecy codes are the only source of security in
a system, then there are many scenarios where eavesdroppers are likely to obtain
information about the message, such as when an eavesdropper has better channel
quality than the legitimate receiver. Therefore, a multilayer approach to security
clearly outperforms standalone cryptography, and casts physical-layer security coding
into a reasonable security role, that of security enhancement.
6.1 Conclusions
The objective of this research was to provide a multilayer security solution for trans-
mitted data in a digital communications system using the combination of physical-
layer security coding and application-layer cryptography. With this goal in mind,
we first performed cryptanalysis with error-prone ciphertext for a simple substitution
cipher in Chapter 3, and LFSR-based stream ciphers in Chapter 4. We concluded
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that a simple substitution cipher, although insecure as a standalone cipher nowadays,
is often an ingredient in more complicated cryptosystems. Hence, the information-
theoretic analysis we provided may yet have further applications in more modern
ciphers. The analysis of stream ciphers differed from that of substitution ciphers,
in that we looked at specific attacks and analyzed the utility of those attacks when
error rates in the ciphertext were greater than zero. For stream ciphers, it was shown
that small error rates in the ciphertext can render attacks useless. The attacks that
were studied were of the fast-correlation variety, and positive error rates in the ci-
phertext tend to decorrelate data until the attacks can no longer extract information
about the secret key. These results are indeed encouraging when we wish to enhance
cryptography be providing error rates in ciphertext.
The second problem we addressed with regards to the multilayer security theme,
focused on the design principles of practical channel coding techniques that exploit
characteristics of the packet erasure wiretap channel model. We invented the family of
stopping set codes, and analyzed their properties. They require feedback to guarantee
reliable transmission for legitimate parties, and to obtain an effective advantage over
eavesdroppers, even when they have lower erasure rates than legitimate receivers.
These codes obscure transmitted ciphertext at an eavesdropper’s receiver, and require
brute-force attacks on a subset of missing bits that are associated with degrees of
freedom in punctured codewords obtained by an eavesdropper.
Solutions to these two problems combine to form a more complete security solution
than either solitary cryptography or isolated physical-layer security channel coding.
Physical-layer security is cast into a cryptographic security enhancement role, reduc-
ing information-theoretic requirements of other less practical schemes to those that
can be obtained in practice. While backing away from the fundamental information-
theoretic security limit of secrecy capacity, design requirements are simplified to the
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point that the codes can be deployed in more uncertain scenarios, e.g. when eaves-
droppers are undetected or channel state information is unknown. Furthermore, if
an eavesdropper enjoys an advantage over legitimate parties, cryptography can still
provide secrecy, even when physical-layer security is impossible. Channel codes that
confuse an eavesdropper’s ciphertext naturally force another layer of complexity on
cryptographic attacks. Cryptanalysis techniques that take into account noisy cipher-
text can allow this security enhancement to be quantified.
6.2 Future Work
The work presented here can be listed with many other contributions in the area
of physical-layer security, although this work certainly leans toward the practical
implementation aspects of the research area. However, our work on the cryptanalysis
of noisy ciphertext, according to our knowledge, is the first of its kind, and may yet
initiate more research in multilayer security. We also hope that this work will allow
physical-layer security research to find better coding techniques that can apply to a
multitude of different channel scenarios, and thus, become less dependent on perfect
channel state information and other limiting requirements for real-world use.
112
REFERENCES
[1] J. Wales, “Wikipedia,” http://www.wikipedia.org/, Apr. 2012.
[2] R. A. Mollin, Codes The Guide to Secrecy from Ancient to Modern Times, ser.
Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications, K. H. Rosen, Ed. Boca Raton, FL:
Chapman & Hall/CRC Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.
[3] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp.
1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[4] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Information Theory to
Security Engineering. To Appear: Cambridge University Press, Sept. 2011.
[5] W. K. Harrison and S. W. McLaughlin, “Combining wiretap codes with the
simple substitution cipher,” in Review at IEEE Information Theory Workshop,
Apr. 2012, pp. 1–5.
[6] ——, “Physical-layer security: Combining error control coding and cryptogra-
phy,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Communications (ICC), Dresden, Germany, June
2009, pp. 1–5.
[7] ——, “Tandem coding and cryptography on wiretap channels: EXIT chart anal-
ysis,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory (ISIT), Seoul, Korea, June-
July 2009, pp. 1939–1943.
[8] ——, “EXIT charts applied to tandem coding and cryptography in a wiretap
scenario,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Taormina, Sicily, Oct.
2009, pp. 173–177.
[9] W. K. Harrison, J. Almeida, D. Klinc, S. W. McLaughlin, and J. Barros, “Stop-
ping sets for physical-layer security,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory Work-
shop (ITW), Dublin, Ireland, Aug.-Sept. 2010, pp. 1–5.
[10] W. K. Harrison, J. Almeida, S. W. McLaughlin, and J. Barros, “Coding for cryp-
tographic security enhancement using stopping sets,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens.
Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 575–584, Sept. 2011.
[11] ——, “Physical-layer security over correlated erasure channels,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Communications. (ICC), [Online]. Available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.3641, Ottawa, Canada, June 2012, pp. 1–5.
[12] T. K. Moon, Error Correction Coding: Mathematical Methods and Algorithms.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005.
113
[13] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006.
[14] D. R. Stinson, Cryptography Theory and Practice, 3rd ed., ser. Discrete Mathe-
matics and Its Applications, K. H. Rosen, Ed. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman &
Hall/CRC Taylor & Francis Group, 2006.
[15] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst. Tech. J.,
vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[16] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp.
2515–2534, June 2008.
[17] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell Syst. Tech. J.,
vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 623–656, July, Oct. 1948.
[18] I. Csiszár and J. Körner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[19] U. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Information-theoretic key agreement: From weak to
strong secrecy for free,” in Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2000, ser.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, B. Preneel, Ed., vol. 1807. Springer-Verlag,
May 2000, pp. 351–368.
[20] M. Bellare, S. Tessaro, and A. Vardy, “A cryptographic treatment of the wiretap
channel,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, p. 15, 2012.
[21] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “Wire-tap channel II,” Bell Syst. Tech. J.,
vol. 63, no. 10, pp. 2135–2157, Dec. 1984.
[22] V. K. Wei, “Generalized Hamming weights for linear codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1412–1418, Sept. 1991.
[23] R. G. Gallager, Low-Density Parity-Check Codes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1963.
[24] D. J. C. MacKay, “Good error-correcting codes based on very sparse matrices,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 399–431, Mar. 1999.
[25] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. R. Calderbank, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M.
Merolla, “Applications of LDPC codes to the wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 2933–2945, Aug. 2007.
[26] A. T. Suresh, A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, and S. W. McLaughlin,
“Strong secrecy for erasure wiretap channels,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory
Workshop (ITW), Dublin, Ireland, Aug.-Sept. 2010, pp. 1–5.
114
[27] A. Subramanian, A. Thangaraj, M. Bloch, and S. McLaughlin, “Strong secrecy
on the binary erasure wiretap channel using large-girth LDPC codes,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forens. Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 585–594, Sept. 2011.
[28] M. Bellare and S. Tessaro, “Polynomial-time, semantically-secure encryption
achieving the secrecy capacity,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, p. 22, 2012.
[29] M. Bloch, R. Narasimha, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Network security for client-
server architecture using wiretap codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 404–413, Sept. 2008.
[30] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and L. Ying, “Secrecy throughput of MANETs with ma-
licious nodes,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory (ISIT), Seoul,
Korea, June-July 2009, pp. 1189–1193.
[31] M. Baldi, M. Bianchi, and F. Chiaraluce, “Non-systematic codes for physical-
layer security,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Dublin,
Ireland, Aug.-Sept. 2010, pp. 1–5.
[32] D. Klinc, J. Ha, S. W. McLaughlin, J. Barros, and B.-J. Kwak, “LDPC codes for
the Gaussian wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens. Security, vol. 6, no. 3,
pp. 532–540, Sept. 2011.
[33] D. Klinc, J. Ha, S. McLaughlin, J. Barros, and B.-J. Kwak, “LDPC codes for
the Gaussian wiretap channel,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory Workshop
(ITW), Taormina, Sicily, Oct. 2009, pp. 95–99.
[34] D. Klinc, J. Ha, S. W. McLaughlin, J. Barros, and B.-J. Kwak, “LDPC codes
for physical layer security,” in Proc. IEEE Global Telecommunications Conf.
(GLOBECOM), Honolulu, HI, Nov. 2009, pp. 1–6.
[35] E. Arıkan, “Channel polarization: A method for constructing capacity-achieving
codes for symmetric binary-input memoryless channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 3051–3073, July 2009.
[36] E. Hof and S. Shamai, “Secrecy-achieving polar-coding for binary-input mem-
oryless symmetric wire-tap channels,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
Available online at http://arxiv.org/PS cache/arxiv/pdf/1005/1005.2759v2.pdf,
Aug. 2010.
[37] H. Mahdavifar and A. Vardy, “Achieving the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels
using polar codes,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, Available online at
http://arxiv.org/PS cache/arxiv/pdf/1007/1007.3568v1.pdf, July 2010.
[38] R. J. Blom, “Bounds on key equivocation for simple substitution ciphers,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 8–18, Jan. 1979.
[39] J. G. Dunham, “Bounds on message equivocation for simple substitution ci-
phers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 522–527, Sept. 1980.
115
[40] A. Sgarro, “Error probabilities for simple substitution ciphers,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 190–198, Mar. 1983.
[41] A. Orlitsky, N. P. Santhanam, K. Viswanathan, and J. Zhang, “Limit results on
pattern entropy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 2954–2964, July
2006.
[42] T. Siegenthaler, “Correlation-immunity of nonlinear combining functions for
cryptographic applications (corresp.),” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 30, no. 5,
pp. 776–780, Sept. 1984.
[43] V. S. Pless, “Encryption schemes for computer confidentiality,” IEEE Trans.
Comput., vol. C-26, no. 11, pp. 1133–1136, Nov. 1977.
[44] P. R. Geffe, “How to protect data with ciphers that are really hard to break,”
Electronics, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 99–101, Jan. 1973.
[45] J. Massey, “Shift-register synthesis and BCH decoding,” IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 122–127, Jan. 1969.
[46] W. Blaser and P. Heinzmann, “New cryptographic device with high security
using public key distribution,” IEEE Student Papers, p. 150, 1979-1980.
[47] T. Siegenthaler, “Decrypting a class of stream ciphers using ciphertext only,”
IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. C-34, no. 1, pp. 81–85, Jan. 1985.
[48] W. Meier and O. Staffelbach, “Fast correlation attacks on certain stream ci-
phers,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, pp. 159–176, 1989.
[49] V. V. Chepyzhov and B. J. M. Smeets, “On a fast correlation attack on certain
stream ciphers,” in EUROCRYPT, 1991, pp. 176–185.
[50] T. Johansson and F. Jonsson, “Theoretical analysis of a correlation attack based
on convolutional codes,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 48, no. 8, pp. 2173–2181,
Aug. 2002.
[51] A. Blum, M. Furst, M. Kearns, and R. Lipton, “Cryptographic primitives based
on hard learning problems,” in CRYPTO ’93, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 773, 1994, pp. 278–291.
[52] A. Blum, A. Kalai, and H. Wasserman, “Noise-tolerant learning, the parity prob-
lem, and the statistical query model,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 50, no. 4, pp.
506–519, July 2003.
[53] M. P. C. Fossorier and M. J. Mihaljević, “A novel algorithm for solving the LPN
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